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INTRODUCTION

The professionalism movement aims to improve the conduct or, more
controversially, the moral character of lawyers. It also incidentally seeks to
bolster the public image of lawyers, either to ward off additional regulation by
non-professionals or simply to make the practice of law more satisfying. This
conference is focused specifically on the effectiveness of commissions, centers,

* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. I am grateful to conference
organizers Roy Stuckey and Deborah Rhode for their invitation to The NationalConference on
Enhancingthe Professionalismof Lawyers, and to Deborah Rhode and Jack Sammons for their
thoughtful comments.
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and committees in responding to the perceived crisis in professionalism. In this
paper, I want to ask a similar question at a higher level of abstraction. The
proposals made by reformers, whether they modify law school curricula,
expand mandatory continuing legal education, or promulgate professionalism
creeds and oaths, all share a foundational premise: Lawyers can be motivated
through education to act rightly, even if it is contrary to their self-interest to do
so. The validity of this premise has been under sustained attack, however,
throughout much of the history of moral philosophy and more recently in the
Holmes Lectures delivered by Judge Richard Posner.' In the domain of
professional ethics, critics have pointed to several conditions that discourage
ethical conduct: the changing structure of the legal profession, the rise of
multi-state and multi-disciplinary law practices, the pressure of billable hours,
and the specialization of law practice.2 Posner and the structural critics make
essentially the same claim: Instruction in matters of ethics is insufficient to
motivate a lawyer to act against her self-interest.
The critics argue that something else is necessary for motivation: the threat
of legal sanctions, informal penalties imposed by a social or occupational group
(such as retaliation, ostracism, gossip, or other forms of public disapproval),3
or the realignment of incentives to bring ethical precepts into line with the
lawyer's self-interest. It is time for scholarship on legal ethics and
professionalism to face this argument squarely, particularly in the discussion
of the effectiveness of professionalism programs and centers. Unfortunately,
even the best writing in professional ethics tends to assume that figuring out the
answer to some ethical dilemma is the end of the task and that lawyers will be
properly motivated to act rightly once the solution to a problem has been
clarified.4 For example, William Simon, a leading academic legal ethicist,
"takes for granted that lawyers are substantially motivated to act ethically."5
This assumption might be borne out, but it must be demonstrated, not assumed
as an axiom. I hope to illuminate the connection between ethical knowledge
and motivation by drawing from the sizeable literature on value theory and
reasons for action within academic moral philosophy. My claim is not that
lawyers must become applied philosophers, but that educators of lawyers can
1. Richard A. Posner, 1997 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The ProblematicsofMoral

and Legal Theory, 111 HARV.L. REv. 1637, 1664-68 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Lectures].

2. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL

PROFESSION4 (1993); DEBORAHL.RHODE, INTHE INTERESTS OFJUSTICE: REFORMINGTHELEGAL

PROFESSION (2000); Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and EthicalMember ofan
Unhappy, Unhealthy,and UnethicalProfession,52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 915-20 (1999).
3. See Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in
ProfessionalCommunities, 54 VAND. L. Rv. (forthcoming 2001).

4. For a noteworthy exception, see Tanina Rostain, EthicsLost: Limitations of Current

Approaches to Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1273 (1998).

5. William H. Simon, EthicalDiscretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1083, 1144
(1988). This position may be called an error thesis, insofar as it implies that acting unethically
can be attributed to the agent's being wrong about what she ought to do in the circumstances.

See J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 35(1977).
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take comfort from this body of scholarship, for the 6picture is not as bleak as
Posner and other critics of ethics education suggest.
Reasons for action certainly can refer to interests, desires, or attachments
of the agent, but they are not all reducible to self-interest. A person may care
a great deal about family members; friends; a nation or culture; religion; artistic
or intellectual achievement; an ideology or cause such as socialism, feminism,
the labor movement, or the eradication of poverty; or abstract ideals like
justice, liberty, or benevolence. Personal commitments matter to us because
they are valuable, not merely because we choose them as objects of our desire.
In that way, they are not equivalent to arbitrarily-given preferences, such as a
taste for rum-raisin ice cream. Instead, they are values whose source is external
to us, in which we are invested, in the strong sense of being moved by them in
our lives! My claim is that many, if not most lawyers, are drawn to their work
by a perception of overlap between their personal commitments and ideals to
which the legal profession is dedicated. To the extent there is motivational
force to professional ethics, it derives from these shared values s Of course,
there may be lawyers who share none of the value commitments of the legal
profession; for these lawyers, coercion may be the only effective motivation for
action. But I believe (and hope) that few lawyers are truly motivated solely by
making money. If this claim is borne out, arguments in legal ethics are not
doomed to irrelevance, as Posner contends. 9
Before discussing motivation, Part II takes a brief look at several
definitions of "professionalism" that have been offered. This symposium is
aimed at assessing the effectiveness of various means for improving lawyer
professionalism, so it is necessary to clarify some conceptual uncertainties
before proceeding with the central task of the conference. Following the
discussion of professionalism, Part III summarizes Posner's challenge to ethics
education and relates it to some classic debates in moral philosophy. The
argumentative heart of the paper is in Part IV, which explains the connection
between reasons for action and ethical knowledge. Finally, Part V relates this
argument specifically to the legal profession.

6. See infra Part III.
7. Compare the term "moral sources" as it is used in CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE
SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 91-107 (1989) (defining the good as a moral
source "in a highly general sense, designating anything considered valuable, worthy, admirable,
of whatever kind of category").
8. The growing scholarship on lawyers' dissatisfaction with their jobs reveals that a
significant source of this unhappiness is the disjunction between lawyers' value commitments
and their day-to-day activities. See infra note 236.
9. See infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
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II. AMBIGUITIES OF PROFESSIONALISM

The inability of those who criticize the state of the legal profession to agree
on the definition of the word "professionalism"'" considerably muddies the
debate over whether education about professionalism can have any
motivational force. Thus, it is never especially clear what should be done about
the supposed crisis or whether suggested reforms are likely to be successful.
One of the more embarrassing failures to clearly define terms comes from the
American Bar Association's Professionalism Committee, which adopts this
definition of a professional lawyer: "A professional lawyer is an expert in law
pursuing a learned art in service to clients and in the spiritofpublic service;
and engaging in these pursuits as part of a common calling to promote justice
and the public good."" The ABA's analysis is hopelessly circular because of
the key phrase "in the spirit of public service." "Public service" is defined by
the committee as follows: "A lawyer representing individual clients and
zealously advocating their interests in a professional manner is engaged in
public service."' 2 Since "professional" or "in a professional manner" was the
term forwhich we were seeking a definition in the firstplace, the ABA's report
begs the question. The circularity is not merely semantic because the
appropriate balance between service to clients and public service is highly
contestable; a conception of professionalism must provide guidance for lawyers
who are struggling with this conflict of duties.
In this Part, therefore, I will attempt to identify a definition of
professionalism by considering some of the claims that critics have made about
the declining state of this value among American lawyers. Taken together,
these polemics demonstrate not only that professionalism is susceptible of a
wide range of definitions (a fairly unremarkable point), but also that the
professionalism critique proceeds from a diversity of normative standpoints.
Each one of these conceptions posits a different balance between the principle
of service to clients and the spirit of public service. In other words, there are
multiple visions ofgood lawyering with some currency among lawyers,judges,
and professors, and one's reaction to any given proposal to improve lawyer

10. See VINCENT Luizzi, A CASE FOR LEGAL ETHICS: LEGAL ETHICS AS A SOURCE FOR A
UNIvERsAL ETHIC 67-107 (1993) (reviewing and criticizing numerous definitions of
professionalism).
11. A.B.A. SECTION ON LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONTO THE BAR, TEACHING AND LEARNING
PROFESSIONALISM 6 (1996) [hereinafter TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM] (emphasis
added). This definition isborrowed fromRoscoe Pound. See ROSCOEPOUND,THELAWYERFROM
ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953) (stating that a profession is characterized by "pursuing
a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service").
12. TEACHINGANDLEARNINGPROFESSIONALISM,supra note 11, at 6 n.22 (emphasis added).
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professionalism depends critically on which of these visions one subscribes
to.13

A.

Oligopoly

One group of critics emphasizes the Weberian conception of a profession
as a tightly controlled guild or cartel and attacks the legal profession for
erecting barriers to entry to lower-cost competitors or for excluding others in
society from its ranks. 4 On this account, the coveted label "profession" allows
its members to exclude competitors and elevate their social status, and it
reduces pressure on the occupation to lower its fees or otherwise make its
services more broadly available. It also obviates external regulation of the
occupational group, such as legislation or oversight by an administrative
agency. 5 In order to maintain guild status, relatively free of government
regulation, an occupational group must convince the public that it possesses
specialized knowledge that may be used for socially desirable ends.
Professionals may use a variety of strategies to maintain the public's respect,
such as employing mystifying styles of language and imposing onerous
education and licensing requirements (such as bar examinations) as conditions
for entry into the profession. 6
Those within the profession who implicitly accept the guild structure may
fulminate against what they perceive as occasional bad apples who tarnish the
reputation of the profession and bring about pressure for increased regulation
by non-professionals. 7 Correspondingly, critics can explain the emphasis
13. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter'sCommentaryon the ProfessionalismCrusade,74 TEx.
L. REv. 259,268 (1995) (arguing that professionalism is not a monolithic concept and that many
different justifiable visions of ethical lawyering coexist in the American legal tradition).
14. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERs 17-30 (1989); RICHARD A. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW 39-60 (1995) [hereinafter POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW] (discussing the rise
of the legal profession's cartel and how it allows firms to increase prices above competitive
levels); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 185 (1999)
[hereinafter POSNER, PROBLEMATICS] (stating one key to the law maintaining its professional
mystique is to limit outside competition and minimize inside competition); Richard L. Abel, Why
Does the ABA PromulgateEthicalRules?, 59 TEx. L. REV. 639, 687 (1981) (noting "[1]awyers
are... partisans in the class conflict that capitalism generates and cannot resolve, and virtually
all lawyers are enlisted on the side of capital"); RHODE, supra note 2, at 209-10 (advocating less
restrictive approaches to licensing lawyers and paraprofessionals who provide legal services to
underserved segments of the public).
15. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 134 (1998) ("Hurst and Hart
argued that when business lawyers failed to curb their clients abuses, government typically
responded with regulatory constraints. Of course, the more likely this response, the more the
argument for responsibility shaded into the argument for long-run self-interest.").
16. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 14, at 186-88; cf. STANLEY FISH, AntiProfessionalism, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 215 (1989) (stating that antiprofessionalists claim professions lose sight of what is true, valuable, or socially useful).
17. See e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1980) ("[I]t is the desire
for the respect and confidence... of the society which he serves that should provide to a lawyer
the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct."); RHODE, supra note 2, at 5
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professional ideology places on self-regulation and governance through codes
of ethics as a public-relations ploy to blunt the attacks of those who seek to
expose the guild system as an illegitimate restraint on the provision of legal
services. We reasonably maybe suspicious of a group that claims to place itself
beyond the reach of moral criticism by promulgating rules for its own
governance. Critics who focus on the oligopolistic tendencies of professions
also advocate reforms, such as increased pro bono work by lawyers,' abroader
range of alternative dispute resolution procedures, 9 or relaxed licensing
requirements, depending on other ideological commitments, such as their
relative degree of confidence in the free market. ° Of course these reforms may
also be criticized as bad-faith attempts to perpetuate the process of
mystification by "concealing the self-interested character of efforts to limit
competition."'"
Although the oligopoly explanation accounts for some observed features
of the legal profession, it is difficult to square with the loss of market control
experienced by lawyers over the past ten or twenty years.' It also does not take
into account the decreasing role of the organized bar, relative to courts and
legislatures, in regulating the profession.' Although no lawyer wishes to be
disciplined, there are a great many practical situations in which running afoul
of the disciplinary codes should be the least of the actor's worries. In addition

(reporting belief by New York bar leaders that the misdeeds of a few lawyers attract
disproportionatepublic attention); Diana Huffman, EthicsReviewNeededto PolishPublicImage
ofBar, LEGALTIMES, Jan. 31,1983, at9 (illustrating publicized ethical violations by lawyers and
their impact on the public's perception, and urging the bar to treat ethical issues more seriously).
Many reforms, such as the prohibition on direct-mail solicitation of accident victims, have been
motivated by the bar's anxiety about the public's perception of lawyers. See Florida Bar v. Went
For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 626-29 (1995) (upholding such a regulation).
18. See, e.g., RUDOLPH J.GERBER, LAWYERS, COURTS, AND PROFESSIONALISM 21 (1989);
Richard C. Baldwin, "RethinkingProfessionalism"-And Then Living Id, 41 EMORY L.J. 433,
448-49 (1992); Jill Chaifetz, The Value ofPublic Service: A Modelfor Instilling a ProBono
Ethic in Law School,45 STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1709-11 (1993).
19. RHODE, supra note 2, at 131-35.
20. These critics can be avid defenders of the market, or can adopt a very different ideal of
social justice, for example, emphasizing a more egalitarian distribution of resources or racial
justice. See Eliot Friedson, Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in LAWYERS'
IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRAcTICES: TRANSFORMATIONSINTHEAMERICANLEGALPROFESSION 215,218

(Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (noting Milton Friedman's proposal to eliminate professional
licensing); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in
CorporateLawFirms?An InstitutionalAnalysis,84 CAL.L.REv. 493,514-42 (1996) (critiquing
the professional values that result in discrimination against black lawyers).

21.

POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 14, at 189.
ELLIOTT A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS: PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE

22. See

1930 TO THE PRESENT 283 (1996); Herbert M. Kritzer, Abel and the
ProfessionalProject: The InstitutionalAnalysis of the Legal Profession, 16 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 529, 540-44 (1991).
23. For an account of the struggle between the organized bar and other institutions to
exercise dominance over regulation of the legal profession, see Susan P. Koniak, The Law
Between the Barand the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389 (1992).
ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM,
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to worrying about losing their licenses, lawyers must also avoid being
sanctioned by courts, being sued by clients or third parties for malpractice,
having their transactions rescinded for fraud, or even being fined or imprisoned
for violating criminal law.
The critics of professionalism as guild ideology may be attacking a
strawperson, since it is relatively clear that lawyers have not been notably
successful in maintaining their independence from external sources of
competition or regulation. At the same time, however, there is some truth to the
observation that the rhetoric of professionalism can be a smokescreen for the
bar's interest in being free from external regulation. There is an admirable
dimension to the struggle for professional independence-freedom from statesponsored regulation makes it easier for lawyers to challenge the exercise of
state power.' But lawyers must be careful to ensure that their self-imposed
scheme of regulations is in the public interest; otherwise, pressure will build on
state actors to bring the bar's self-imposed norms into line with social interests.
B. Technique
Professionalism is also employed as a synonym for technical competence.'
This definition is familiar from ordinary language, as in "that plumber really
did a professional job" or in Arthur Applbaum's parody of the claims of
professionalism made by Charles-Henri Sanson, the executioner of Paris.26
What is interesting about this sense of the word is that it frequently excludes
discussion of a moral dimension of professional roles. One critic has written
that the university has historically disdained ethics education, claiming to be
uniquely suited to produce experts at demanding tasks requiring extensive
education." University teachers have avoided talking about values because the
skills of reflective judgment and ethical reasoning were foreign to the
university's expertise in transmitting "objective," rigorous knowledge." The
professions, eager to capitalize on the prestige of the natural sciences, have
been enthralled with scientific models of their disciplines, as in the technocratic
conception of legal reasoning made famous by Langdell.29 This vision of the
relationship between ethics and technical mastery continues to be reflected in
some contemporary writings about ethics education in law schools. For

24. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence ofLawyers, 68 B.U.L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1988).
25. See, e.g., DARYLKOEHNTHEGROUNDOFPROFESSIONALETHICS 15-33 (1994); DONALD

A. SCHON, THEREFLECTIVEPRACITMONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK INACTION 21-37 (1983)
(explaining the model of Technical Rationality, which states that professionals solve rigorous
problems by applying scientific theory and technique).
26. See ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN

PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE 15-42 (1999).
27. See William F. May, ProfessionalEthics: Setting, Terrain, and Teacher, in ETHICS
TEACHING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 205, 206-07 (Daniel Callahan & Sissela Bok eds., 1980).
28. See id. at 207.
29. See SCH6N, supra note 25, at 28-29.
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instance, two commentators on legal education make the startling suggestion
that "instruction in professional responsibility should not be premised on the
correctness ofany particular [moral] theory."3' Apparently, the legal profession
may legitimately impose regulations on lawyers, but law professors must
pretend that these regulations are value-neutral.
This stance is-not to put too fine apoint upon it-untenable. The division
between scientific knowledge, on the one hand, and ethics, on the other, has
been undercut from several different directions. First, legal rules embody a
moral position, as any first-year law student who has expressed horror over the
absence of a duty to rescue in tort law3' or any student of constitutional law
who has struggled with reproductive-rights and sexual-privacy issues can
attest.3 2 The legal realists taught us that legal judgments are fundamentally
policy decisions-that is, moral and political decisions legitimated by legal
reasoning. This critique has been carried through by modem philosophers of
law, particularly Ronald Dworkin, who emphasizes the necessary connection
between legal rules, underlying moral principles, and the authority of law.33 In
an inherently normative discipline, such as professional ethics, the very process
of teaching the subject requires stating and contesting evaluative judgments. 3"
Second, the once-dominant logical positivist view in philosophy, which held
that ethical concepts are nonsensical because they could not be reduced to
empirically testable propositions,3" has given way to a much more sophisticated
understanding of the relationship between facts and values.36 Third, the claims

30. Ian Johnstone & Mary Patricia Treuthart, Doing the Right Thing: An Overview of
TeachingProfessional Responsibility, 41 J.LEGALEDUC. 75,83 (1991); see also Lee Modjeska,
On Teaching Morality to Law Students, 41 J. LEGAL EDuc. 71 (1991) (arguing that law
professors should guard against ideological abuse and focus on imparting knowledge and
communication skills).
31. Discussion of the legal and moral duties to rescue is seemingly endless. For a recent
academic exchange, see Symposium, Law, Ethics, and the Good Samaritan: Should There Be
a Duty to Rescue?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957 (2000). The locus classicus is James Barr
Ames, Law and Morals,22 HARV. L. REV.97 (1908).
32. On the moral content of law, see generally Kent Greenawalt, Legal Enforcement of
Morality, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 710 (1995).
33. See RONALD DwORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986); see also Jean Bethke Elshtain, Law and
the Moral Life, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 383 (1999) (arguing that the law is a form of moral
thinking).
34. See MIKEW. MARTIN, MEANINGFUL WORK: RETHINKING PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 102-03
(2000).

35. See, e.g.,

ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND LOGIC

102-12 (Dover

Publications 1952) (1946).
36. See generallyRICHARDJ. BERNSTEIN,BEYoNDOBJECTIVISMAND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE,
HERMENEUTnCS, AND PRAxis (1983) (comparing the concepts ofdialogue, debate, conversation,
and communication and their impact on ethics and politics); STANLEY CAVELL, Part Three:
Knowledge and the Concept ofMorality, in THE CLAIM OF REASON: WITrGENSTEIN, SKEPTICISM,
MORALITY, AND TRAGEDY (1979); JOSEPH DUNNE, BACK TO THE ROUGH GROUND: 'PHRONESIS'
AND'TEcHNE' IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND IN ARISTOTLE 187-91 (1993); THOMAS NAGEL, THE
VIEW FROM NOWHERE 138-63 (1986); BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF
PHILOSOPHY 132-55 (1985); Richard N. Boyd, How to Be a MoralRealist, in ESSAYS ONMORAL
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to objectivity of the natural sciences have been questioned,37 although it is
important not to exaggerate the extent to which scientific knowledge is merely
culturally contingent. 8 Certainly, though, the identification of objectivity solely
with the methods of empirical science is no longer accepted without question.39
Ethics differs from science, both in its characteristic methods of establishing
the truth of claims and in the expectation of how much consensus can emerge
from its methods, but this difference is not a sufficient reason for rejecting the
claims of ethical reasoning to objectivity.' ° Fourth, the technocratic model of
the professions, in which ethical inquiries are excluded, requires agreement on
ends,' which has notably been lacking in law as well as the other professions.
Finally, the descriptive accuracy of the model ofprofessions as the domain of
evaluatively neutral, "rational" (in the Weberian sense42) reasoning is not
normatively attractive even if it could be realized. As William Simon and
others have argued, the conception of professional knowledge as bureaucratic,
formalized, and emptied of ethical significance leads to profound alienation on
the part of its practitioners, who feel disconnected from other members of
society and from the ideals that gave meaning to their occupation.43
If professional activity is not a bureaucratic, technical process, then what
is it? Working out the relationship between facts and values is an ongoing
project for professional ethicists, many of whom have been attracted to the
concept of judgment, as explicated by thinkers such as Aristotle and Hannah
Arendt.' As many have observed, the legal system serves multiple ends
simultaneously, and choosing among them cannot be a matter of cost-benefit

REALISM 181, 188-99 (Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988).
37. See, e.g., PAULFEYERABEND,AGAiNSTMETHOD (Verso 1988) (1975); THOMAS S.KuHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 5-6 (1962).
38. See ALAN SOKAL & JEAN BRICMONT, FASHIONABLE NONSENSE:
INTELLECTUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE 268-79 (1998).

POSTMODERN

39. See, e.g., CAVELL, supra note 36, at 256-64 (noting that science does not have a 'more
direct avenue to truth"' than ethics just because ethics is based on opinions and science is based
on data (citations omitted)); Stephen Darwall et al., Toward Fin de si~cle Ethics: Some Trends,
101 PHIL.REV. 115, 126 (1992).
40. See, e.g., John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 519
(1980) ("Kantian constructivism holds that moral objectivity is to be understood in terms of a
suitably constructed social point of view that all can accept.").
41. See SCHON, supra note 25, at 33-34, 41.
42. See MAXWEBER, Bureaucracy,in FROM MAXWEBER: ESSAYS INSOCIOLOGY 196,21416 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. & eds., 1946).
43. See SIMON, supra note 15, at 109-37.
44. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); KRONMAN, supranote 2,

at 97 (stating that a wise judgment in the personal sphere rests on the promotion of integrity,
while a wise judgment in the political sphere rests on the promotion ofpolitical fraternity); David
Luban & Michael Millemann, GoodJudgment: EthicsTeachingin Dark Times, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 31, 35-36 (1995) (citing Arendt's view that moral judgment is especially important in
what Arendt calls "dark times").
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analysis which reduces all ends to some common metric.4 We can deliberate
rationally about ends (they are not just a matter of faith or ideology), 46 but this
reasoning is not an algorithmic, quasi-scientific process; rather, it is a matter of
judgment, which is a difficult faculty to theorize on a scientific model. Legal
reasoning, according to these scholars, is not reducible to scientific methods,
nor can it be collapsed into some other discipline, such as economics. 47 It is
something ineffable-a craft or perhaps an intellectual virtue-that can be
appreciated only by those steeped in its mysteries and duly initiated into the
inner circle. I do not mean to be too derisive here; there are obviously certain
kinds of knowledge that may only be acquired by a long process of study and
subordination to the guidance of more experienced practitioners, such as
aesthetic judgments on a rich domain like music or literature. But moving too
far in the direction of anti-theory tends to remove practical reasoning from
criticism. So, any professional's judgment is held to be as good as anyone
else's, or professional judgment is reposed with a small cadre of elites,
uniquely equipped with the virtues to deliberate about ethical matters.43
The result, in the case of legal reasoning, is that celebrations of Aristotelian
practical wisdom have a tendency to come off as quietistic. Throughout the
purported "golden age," a time for which many long, lawyers enjoyed
monopolistic rents; charged virtually anything they wanted for their services;
excluded blacks, women, and Jews from law firns, and campaigned
assiduously to keep the "wrong people" out of the profession; recognized
virtually no obligation to perform pro bono work or otherwise improve access
to legal services;49 and did little to enforce the constitutional rights of

45. See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 2, at 53-66 (stating that as long as a question can be
answered by objective calculations, the deliberative procedure required is clear, but the basis of
judgment is less clear when a question cannot be decided by objective criteria); Heidi Li
Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can GoodLawyersBe GoodEthicalDeliberators?,69 S. CAL. L.
REV. 885 (1996) (arguing that highly technocratic lawyers cannot be good ethical deliberators).
46. See HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABouT FINAL ENDs (1994),
47. See KRONMAN, supra note 2, at 240-64.
48. An eminent anthropologist's caution about interpretive orientations toward cultures can
equally be applied to models of practical judgment that emphasize particulars over general
theories and which stress the ineffability of professional reasoning:
The besetting sin of interpretive approaches to anything-literature,
dreams, symptoms, culture-is that they tend to resist, or to be permitted
to resist, conceptual articulation and thus to escape systematic modes of
assessment. You either grasp an interpretation or you do not, see the point
of it or you do not, accept it or you do not. Imprisoned in the immediacy
of its own detail, it is presented as self-validating, or, worse, as validated
by the supposedly developed sensitivities of the person who presents
it ....
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 24 (1973).
49. This was before Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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individuals." It is therefore essential to disentangle practical wisdom and
professional judgment from their historical connection with the elites of the
corporate bar, whose claims to be repositories of unique professional integrity
were often belied by the anti-social ends to which they employed their
expertise.
I believe there is considerable merit to the undertaking of identifying
professional activity with the exercise ofjudgment, but a pair of dangers must
be avoided along the way. The first is the tendency, just noted, to identify the
end of professional expertise with preservation of the status quo, a pitfall
presented by the Aristotelian pedigree of many accounts of judgment.5
Aristotle identified judgment as a virtue, an excellence, which not all possessed
equally; the anti-egalitarian implications of this identification should be clear,
as they are in Kronman's book. 52 The opposite problem is avoiding turning
professional ethics education into a program of indoctrination. Although it is
incorrect to claim that learning professional ethics ought to be value-neutral, it
also should not become a kind of Maoist "re-education" process, where
"tenured radicals" try to enlist their students in revolutionary causes. Teachers
must respect their students' autonomy and the contestability of many of the
normative propositions that are encountered in the course of studying the moral
basis of the professions. But virtues such as broad-mindedness, tolerance, and
intellectual humility are not only compatible with a values-centered approach
to professional ethics, but they also require a strong commitment to values in
order to be intelligible.53 (For what is tolerance if not a nonrelative imperative
to respect dissenting viewpoints?) Thus, teachers of professional ethics must
be aware of potential biases and personal preferences that may not stand up to
scrutiny and must avoid preaching and resorting to non-rational methods of
persuading students, such as coercion or smuggling in a hidden agenda of their
own idiosyncratic views. At the same time, however, they must not fall into the
trap of thinking that professionalism is equivalent to agnosticism on matters of
moral import. 4 The proper balance between detachment from and commitment
to particular normative stances in professional ethics is not only fair to
competing viewpoints and encourages the students to think independently but
also inspires the students to have a thoughtful engagement with the subject

50. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 263-68 (1976); POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 14, at 197-98; Marc
Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK. L. REv. 549,559
(1996). Interestingly, the ABA's professionalism committee is skeptical ofthe nostalgic longing
by some sectors of the professionalism movement. See TEACHING AND LEARNING
PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 11, at 4-5.
51. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
52. See KRONMAN, supra note 2, at 41-52.
53. See id. at 92-101.
54. For a thoughtful exploration of the tension between educators' moral agency and
students' autonomy, see MARTIN, supra note 34, at 102-08.
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through the instructor's own engagement and passion. It is certainly not
achieved by eliminating discussion of values from ethics education.
C. Altruism
A third elaboration on the concept of professionalism is that it entails
subversion of the lawyer's pursuit of material gain. 5 Arguments that lawyers
should not use their knowledge for pecuniary gain have long been a staple of
critics. George Sharswood, in his influential nineteenth-century lectures on
legal ethics, citing Gibbon, actually pins some of the blame of the fall of Rome
on lawyers taking cases for money:
The consequences [of law becoming a trade] may be best
told in the impressive language of the historian of the Decline
and Fall of the Empire:---"The noble art, which had once
been preserved as the sacred inheritance ofthe patricians, was

55. See, e.g., GERBERsupra note 18, at23 ("Today we have lost the ability to distinguish
between a calling and a station in life, to see differences between a profession and a trade. To
the extent that law students and lawyers become absorbed in status and gain, law ceases to be
a profession ....
"); Arlin M. Adams, The LegalProfession: A CriticalEvaluation, 93 DICK. L.
REV. 643, 652 (1989) (noting "the decline of professionalism and its replacement with
commercialism"); Norman Bowie, The Law: From a Professionto aBusiness, 41 VAND. L. REV.
741 (1988) (noting the undesirability of the law becoming more like a business and losing its
focus on its purpose, society's values, andjustice); Tom C. Clark, TeachingProfessionalEthics,
12 SAN DIEGO L. REV.249, 251 (1975) ("[T]he primacy of service over profit is the criterion
which distinguishes a profession from a business."); Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism
Paradigm Shift: Why DiscardingProfessional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and
Reputation of the Bar,70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229, 1231 (1995) ("[I]n contrast to businesspersons,
who maximize financial self-interest, lawyers altruistically place the good oftheir clients and the
good ofsociety above their own self-interest."); MICHAELH.TRoTrER,PROFITANDTHE PRACTICE
OF LAW: WHAT'S HAPPENED TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION 197-98 (1997). Ironically, other

definitions ofprofessionalism distinguish a profession from a hobby or pastime by thepresence
of a profit motive: "Professionals engage in their chosen activities 'for a living' rather than 'for
fun'-as amateurs or dilettantes. ..." Stephen Toulmin, The Meaning of Professionalism:
Doctors' Ethics and Biomedical Science, in KNOWLEDGE VALUE AND BELIEF 254, 256 (H.
Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. & Daniel Callahan eds., 1977).
Some law schools have taken to the Internet to reassure prospective students that, in the
view ofthe faculty, students there will not be learning a mere business, but will be inducted into
a profession. See, e.g., Washburn University School of Law, at
http://www.washburnlaw.edu/prospectloverview.htn (lastvisited Dec. 7,2000) ("Students learn
that the law is a profession and not a mere trade."); Pepperdine University School of Law, at
http://Ilaw-www.pepperdine.edu/prospect/deansmsg.shtml (last visited Dec. 7, 2000) ("We
believe that the law is a profession, not a business."). Finally, in an amusing twist on the rhetoric
ofprofessionalism, a firm ofpersonal-injury lawyers representing plaintiffs announced in a New
York City subway advertisement that they are "ProfessionalLawyers that Fight to Win Large
Money Awards for YOU" (emphasis added) next to their phone number, "1-888-I-GOTINJURED." This poster apparently seeks to reassure prospective clients that the firm is not a
bunch of ambulance chasers but a group of professionals who are concerned about lofty
principles ofjustice, not fat contingency fees.
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fallen into the hands of freedmen and plebeians, who, with
cunning rather than with skill, exercised a sordid and
pernicious trade.... The splendid and popular class was
composed of the advocates, who filled the Forum with the
sound of their turgid and loquacious rhetoric. Careless of
fame and of justice, they are described for the most part, as
ignorant and rapacious guides, who conducted their clients
through a maze of expense, of delay, and of disappointment;
from whence, after a tedious series of years, they were at
length dismissed when their patience and fortune were almost
exhausted." Is not this probably the history of the decline of
the profession in all countries from an honorable office to a
money-making trade?56
Less fancifully, Justice O'Connor has written that the distinguishing feature of
a profession is that "membership entails an ethical obligation to temper one's
selfish pursuit of economic success by adhering to standards of conduct that
could not be enforced either by legal fiat or through the discipline of the
' Her words echo the so-called Stanley Commission Report, issued in
market. 57
1986 by the ABA's Commission on Professionalism."8 The commission began
by asking whether the legal profession had "abandoned principle for profit,
professionalism for commercialism." 9 Not surprisingly, given the way the
question was posed, the commission concluded that many of the symptoms of
declining professionalism "could begin to be addressed by subordinating
a
60
lawyer's drive to make money as a primary goal of law practice."
The commercialism critique implies that law risks becoming something
grubby and ignoble, no longer a source of honor and esteem, if lawyers make
too much money at their jobs. But it proves too much, at least in the
oversimplified form in which it is usually presented. First, the commercialism
critique insinuates that any professional who is trying to earn an honest living
must be acting unethically.6' In its most pernicious form, this argument might

56. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPOUND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE
PROFESSION OF THE LAW: DELIVERED BEFORE THE LAW CLASS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

PENNSYLVANIA 72-73 (1854) (citation omitted). Lest anyone miss Sharswood's point, he again
admonished his audience of young lawyers who might be motivated by filthy lucre, that "[a]
horde ofpettifogging, barratrous, custom-seeking, money-making lawyers, is one of the greatest
curses, with which any state or community can be visited." Id. at 80. Perhaps Sharswood was
inspired to his polemical excesses by the behavior of the fictional lawyers in Dickens's Bleak
House, which had been published the previous year. See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE
(Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971) (1853).
57. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 488-89 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
58. The report, formally entitled ":. . In the Spirit of PublicService: "A Blueprintfor the
Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism,is reprinted at 112 F.R.D. 243 (1987).
59.Id. at 251.
60. Id. at 300.
61. See GLENDON,supra note 44, at 69-7 1.
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seem to license unethical behavior as long as the actor was willing to admit that
she was merely abusinessperson, not a professional. But surely businesspeople
recognize an obligation to act within the bounds of moral obligation, even
though they have profit-making as one of their avowed aims.62 (Or, they
recognize earning a profit for their shareholders as a moral obligation, akin to
a trusteeship relationship.)63 Second, it is not hard to convince oneself that
one's primary motivation is not to make money and so to imagine that one is
acting professionally and not in need of further inquiry into moral questions."
Finally, attacking the profession for its undue commercial orientation
presupposes an ideal balance between altruism and profit motivation, but its
proponents do not specify how that balance is to be worked out.6 We do not
live in an age of aristocrat-lawyers, who live off their inherited wealth while
contributing to the public good out of a sense of noblesse oblige. Lawyers-at
least most of them-must earn a living representing clients. There is more than
a whiff of elitism in the demand that lawyers behave more like "professionals"
than businesspeople. Consider the language from Gibbon quoted by
Sharswood-patricians are good, plebeians are bad." This dichotomy suggests
that wealthy lawyers who have no need to earn a living through the practice of
law are to be admired, while struggling, hard-working, store-front lawyers
(often immigrants or members of other out-of-power groups) are the cause of
the profession's woes. Indeed, many so-called ethical regulations, such as the
organized bar's continuing attempt to restrict advertising and soliciting by
lawyers, have been prompted by lower-class lawyers' attempts to make a

62. The literature on business ethics is growing rapidly, and I cannot hope to summarize
it here. For some representative contributions to the field of business ethics, see generally
WILLIAM C.FREDERICK, VALUES, NATURE, AND CULTURE INTHE AMERICAN CORPORATION (1995);
ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONs OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics 230-82 (1980).
63. See FREDERICK, supra note 62; GOLDMAN, supra note 62.

64. See Thomas L. Shaffer, InauguralHoward Lichtenstein Lecture in Legal Ethics:
Lawyer Professionalismas a MoralArgument, 26 GONz. L. REv. 393,411-13 (1990/91).
65. Surprisingly, there are some who not only disagree with the commercialism argument,
but claim the bar should identify more closely with commercial interests. For example, Geoffrey
Hazard criticizes the profession for drifting away from its traditional function of protecting
business property against the pressures of popular majorities. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The
Future of LegalEthics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1266-80 (1991). Compare the populist sentiments
of Louis Brandeis, who argued that the role of lawyers is to curb "the excesses of capital" lest
"[t]here will come a revolt of the people against the capitalists." Louis D. Brandeis, "The
Opportunity in the Law," in Business: A Profession, Address Before the Harvard Ethical Society
(May 4, 1905), in THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 5, 8 (Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 3d ed. 1994). The difference between the arguments of
Brandeis and Hazard perhaps can be attributed to a generally decreasing attachment in the
professions to the ideology ofsocial trusteeship. See STEVENBRINT, INANAGEOFEXPERTS: THE
CHANGING ROLE OF PROFESSIONALS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE 8-10 (1994).
66. See supra text accompanying note 57.
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living.67 One must therefore be wary of the rhetoric ofprofessionalism, as it is
sometimes merely an attempt by powerful lawyers to preserve the status quo.
More subtle critics of the profession's obsession with profit have pointed
out ways in which the emphasis on bottom-line considerations has had farreaching effects on the legal profession.6" Advancement, evaluation,
compensation, and partnership decisions within large law firms are generally
dependent in large part upon the number of hours billed by lawyers. The
resulting inexorable pressure to bill hours leads not only to bill padding and
fraud,' but to tension with attorneys' lives outside the workplace and clashes
with family commitments. The adverse consequences of long hours on families
tend to fall disproportionately on women, as Deborah Rhode and others have
observed.70 Moreover, as business development becomes more important to
attorneys' careers, clients gain leverage to force lawyers to take actions that are
unethical, compromising lawyers' independence of professional judgment. 7,
Finally, as Anthony Kronman argues, the result of intense pressures to work
long hours is a rather one-dimensional kind of person, who cares only about
work and is inhibited from developing as a complete human being, and as a
result is unable to exercise practical judgment on behalf of clients.
D. Etiquette
Some reformers of the legal profession inadvertently trivialize the concept
of professionalism by equating it with norms of civility that are relatively
inconsequential. At the risk of being charged with selectively quoting the
literature, one can easily find numerous exhortations to lawyers to return
clients' phone calls, not berate office staff, work with opposing counsel to
schedule depositions, and not file motions when one's adversary is leaving for
a vacation.73 Without meaning to denigrate the importance of civility, and
recognizing that incidents of petty rudeness can be cumulative and truly
damaging to the effective functioning of the judicial system, it is important to
bracket issues of etiquette from the substantive analysis of legal ethics.

67. See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas ofProfessionalism:The Professional
Ideologies ofLawyers in Context, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATION

AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 177, 190-91 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992)
[hereinafter IDEALS/PRACTICES].
68. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 2, at 31-38.
IN THE

69. See Lisa Lerman, Blue Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraudby
Lawyers, 12 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHICS 205 (1999).
70. RHODE, supra note 2, at 36-37.
71. The famous OPM debacle is widely blamed in part on the disproportionate importance
to the law firm of the client, which accounted for as much as sixty percent of the firm's billings.
See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 305, 310 (3d ed.

1999).
72. See KRONMAN, supra note 2, at 299-300, 304-07.
73. See, e.g., John Patrick Dolan, Courtesy Is Its Own Reward: Lawyers Need to Treat
Others with Respect or Facethe Consequences, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1997, at 104.
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More seriously, the emphasis on politeness and preservation of the
sensibilities of all participants in the judicial process may shade into
repressiveness, which is not too strong aword, when the incivil litigants belong
to unpopular or marginal groups. Consider, as an example, Chief Justice
Burger's diatribe against rudeness:
At the drop of a hat-or less-we find adrenalin-fueled
lawyers cry out that theirs is a "political trial." This seems to
mean in today's context-at least to some-that .. the
necessity for civility-all become[s] irrelevant.
. . . Speakers are shouted down or prevented from
speaking. Editorials tend to become shrill with invective and
political cartoons are savagely reminiscent of a century past.74
What caused the Chief Justice to slip from a discussion of civility in litigation
to a condemnation of shrill editorials? The answer is suggested by his reference
to political trials: The challenges to the authority of judges in cases like the
Chicago Seven conspiracy trial 5 would have been fresh in Burger's memory
in 1971 as he wrote his address to the American Law Institute. Many observers
from the legal establishment believed the riots at the 1968 Democratic
convention in Chicago were a harbinger of the coming apocalypse.76 Freaky,
long-haired young people seemed to be taking over the streets, showing no
respect for law and order and traditional social values." Of course, the other
perspective on the riots begins from observations of police brutality and the
justice of the protesters' cause, which was to bring to public attention the
government's conduct of the war in Vietnam and the lack of any serious
antiwar candidate from either political party.7" In any event, the protesters'
arguments were treated with extraordinary disrespect by the presiding judge,
Julius Hoffman, who repeatedly sustainedprosecution objections to reasonable

74. Warren E. Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211,213-14 (197 1).
75. See generally ANTHONY LUKAS, THE BARNYARD EPITHET AND OTHER OBSCENITIES:
NOTES ON THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL (1970); JOHN SCHULTZ, THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY
TRIAL (rev. ed. 1993); DANIEL WALKER, RIGHTS INCONFLICT: CONVENTION WEEK INCHICAGO,
AUGuST 25-29, 1968 (1968) (report submitted by the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence).
76. See generallyWALKER, supra note 75, at 163-285 (detailing and illustrating the riots
at the 1968 Democratic National Convention).
77. See generallyLUKAS, supranote 75, at 26 (noting the opinions of various jurors on the
street demonstrators). One of the participants in the NationalConference on Enhancingthe
ProfessionalismofLawyers: Can Commissions, Committees and CentersMake a Difference?
(Savannah, GA, Oct. 20-21, 2000), recalled that his law school faculty paid attention to ethics
and professionalism only once-when a state bar association attempted to deny admission to one
of the school's graduates on the ground that he had a beard.
78. See WALKER, supra note 75, at I (stating the violence was "inflicted upon persons who
had broken no law").
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attempts to introduce exculpatory evidence, denied defense motions without
hearing arguments, helped the government pick a biased jury, and handed out
dozens of contempt sentences, sometimes for offenses as minor as laughing or
smirking. 9 What ChiefJustice Burger characterized as unprofessional conduct
by lawyers like William Kunstler and Leonard Weinglass 0 may also be
understood as exemplary professionalism by lawyers for unpopular clients
facing the authority of the government and the animus of a biased judge.
Certainly there is nothing unprofessional about challenging the state's abuse of
power or resisting contempt citations based on imaginary slights to thejudge's
dignity. 8'
I am not denying that some lawyers are jerks and that in the mine-run of
cases their obnoxiousness is not ennobled by resisting government oppression,
as in the Chicago Seven trial. But when the professionalism movement
becomes preoccupied with politeness, rather than more serious ethical
concerns, it risks legitimating attempts by powerful actors to preserve the status
quo, as against challenges by brash, defiant, and, yes, sometimes rude
outsiders. More broadly, the Chicago Seven case shows the potential for the
rhetoric of professionalism to be abused by powerful insiders. In a similar, but
less dramatic case, a lawyer made a motion to disqualify a judge in a rural
county for engaging in ex parte contacts with the opposing lawyer.8 2 Not only
did the judge deny the motion, but he accused the lawyer who filed it of acting
in an unprofessional manner and forced the lawyer to apologize. 3 Of course,
it is engaging in ex parte communication that is unprofessional, not making a
good-faith motion to disqualify the judge. Because of the insularity of the
community in which the lawyer practiced, however, the extant power structure
was able to define as unprofessional behavior that which fully complied with
formal legal rules." Furthermore, the norm of civility enforced by the
community may be at odds with formal legal entitlements. For example, in
many small towns it is considered unprofessional to interrupt an adversary's
closing argument with an objection; in some states, however, the objecting
lawyer risks waiving the objection by waiting until the end of the closing
argument.8 5 The lawyer is therefore whipsawed between considerations of
"professionalism": courtesy to the opposing lawyer and doing an effective job
representing one's client. The bottom line is that professionalism cannot

79. See generallySCHULTZ, supra note 75.
80. See infra text accompanying note 74.
81. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 647 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (urging lawyers to resist some judges' "preference for
nonconfrontational styles of advocacy").
82. See Roy B. FLEMMING ETAL., THE CRAFTOFJUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK IN CRIMINAL
COURT COMMUNITIES 156 (1992).

83. See id.
84. See id. at 154-56.
85. Darryl K. Brown, CriminalProcedureEntitlements, Professionalism,and Lawyering
Norms, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 801, 824-25 (2000).
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become such a consuming value that lawyers are tempted to neglect obligations
they have to their clients simply to respect the formal structure of the disputeresolution system.
E. Aspiration
Another sense of the word that frequently is encountered at professionalism
conferences and in the literature is that of an aspirational code of conduct-a
set of norms that, for some reason, cannot be embodied in an enforceable set
of legal rules. For example, the report on professionalism prepared by a group
of prominent lawyers and judges for the Conference of Chief Justices stresses
the aspirational nature of professionalism, calling it an ideal transcending mere
legal ethics and "the highest dictates of the legal profession."86 The report
recommends that law teachers "should clarify the distinction between
professionalism and overzealous advocacy."87 It recognizes that this difference
cannot be captured in enforceable rules, so the report recommends that state
involvement be limited to educational initiatives, such as compulsory
attendance at "an ethics school" or other continuing legal education programs. 8
This critique resembles some of the objection to Bill Clinton's behavior as
President; many have argued that the role of President carries with it
obligations to behave as an exemplar of the highest moral values of the
nation-a public role model, so to speak.8 9 It is also familiar from the frequent
references to Atticus Finch in professionalism discussions; the protagonist of
To Kill a Mockingbird is supposed to be understood (and, in fact, is
understood) by lawyers as a hero, not merely as someone who adequately
measures up to some mandatory standard of conduct.9" The attribution of
heroism makes sense only if we recognize some kind of non-mandatory
dimension to lawyers' ethics, so that we can say that one lawyer exceeds others
in excellence, but the other, ordinary lawyers are not acting immorally.
Unfortunately, identifying professionalism with aspiration tends to open
wide the door to pious-sounding platitudes. Consider the American Bar
Association's expressed hope that its Canons of ProfessionalEthics would
provide "a beacon light on the mountain of high resolve to lead the young
86. A.B.A. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON LAWYER
CONDUcTAND PROFESSIONALISM 1 (1999), availableat http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/natlplan.htm (last
visited Jan. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Chief Justices' Report]. The Chief Justices' Report further
provides that "[u]nlike disciplinary rules that can be implemented and enforced, professionalism
is a personal characteristic." Id.
87.Id. at 15.
88. See id. at 19-20.
89. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION,
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 148-66 (1999).
90. For a thoughtful and provocative argument that Atticus Finch ought to be displaced in
the pantheon of lawyer-heroes by the more nuanced character of Gavin Stevens, see Rob
Atkinson, LiberatingLawyers: Divergent Parallelsin Intruder in the Dust and To Kill a
Mockingbird, 49 DUKE L.J. 601 (1999).
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practitioner safely through the snares and pitfalls of his early practice up to and
along the straight and narrow path of high and honorable professional
achievement." 91 If the ABA had intended its pronouncements on legal ethics
to sound like a bad graduation speech, it certainly succeeded in this passage.
Such empty exhortations to virtue are all too common in commentary by
lawyers on professionalism, with the result that lawyers and law students often
do not perceive questions about professional morality to be intellectual issues
worthy of sustained study and reflection. Thus, whatever quarrels I have with
Posner's article, and there are many, it is at least refreshing that he has chosen
to employ his rhetorical talents on a critique of ethics education. His attack may
ironically strengthen law-school-based ethics curricula by forcing educators to
think more rigorously about their discipline.
As everyone involved with the law of professional responsibility is well
aware, the disciplinary rules of the legal profession formerly contained a series
of aspirational statements of ideals to which lawyers ought to aspire, but which
were not to form the basis of disciplinary actions if violated.9' The two-tiered
structure of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, with its division
between black-letter, enforceable disciplinary rules ("DR"s) on the one hand,
and idealistic ethical considerations ("EC"s) on the other, was frequently
criticized for creating interpretive confusion.93 Courts sometimes looked to the
ECs to illuminate the meaning of DRs, treating the aspirational statements as
something like legislative history.94 In some places, key terms in the DRs were
defined in the ECs, making this interpretive spillover inevitable. 95 Some critics
also contended that the idealistic tone of the ECs was an anachronistic
embarrassment to the legal profession, at least if it was properly regarded as a
profit-making enterprise like any other.96 No one proposes exhorting oil
companies to charge fairly for their product; rather, the Federal Trade
Commission commences an investigation of price-gouging when gas prices
appear too high. To defend an aspirational conception of professionalism, one
would have to point to ways in which professions differ from ordinary business
ventures. I believe there is such a connection, but it does not support
conceiving of professionalism on a purely aspirational dimension. Rather, the
essence of professional ethics is located in the connection between the ends
served by the profession and some social need. Social interests generate moral
principles, but they are mandatory, not aspirational. The following section
outlines this conception of professionalism.

91. Report of the Committee on [the] Code ofProfessionalEthics, 1906 A.B.A. REP. 600,
quoted in David Luban & Michael Millemann, GoodJudgment: Ethics Teachingin Dark Times,
9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 31, 45 (1995).
92. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVAsIVE
METHOD 44 (1994).
93. See id. at 48-49.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 49-50.
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F. Social Values

Some sociologists of the professions, from the structural/functional school,
posit that the aim of professionalism ought to be to create greater coincidence
between professional values and the moral principles of the political
community as a whole.97 Drawing from the work of Talcott Parsons, these
theorists understand professions as performing important social functions, like
promoting health (medicine) or justice (law). Professions mediate between
citizens, the state, and other organizations in society by reposing complex
knowledge with specially trained and public-spirited individuals, who then
enable citizens to conform their actions to social norms.9" The role of a
professional on the structural/functional account is shaped by public needs, so
professional institutions such as schools and self-regulatory mechanisms like
disciplinary codes exist to channel professional behavior in socially desirable
ways.99 Significantly, the needs of the public here are for goods and services
that are essential to human life:
[T]he professions ... deal with something different than do
the crafts and business.... [H]ealth care, obtaining justice,
being taught, or gaining salvation are not precisely
commodity transactions.... To be cured or healed, we are
forced to trust another human being with the most sacred,
intimate, and vital aspects of our own existence." °
Precisely because of the importance of the interests affected by professional
activities, professionals are required to respect certain widely shared moral
values. In other words, professional activities cannot be justified by moral
principles that are purely internal to the practice.' Doctors cannot disregard
patient interests, and lawyers cannot ignore either the interests of clients or the

97. See William H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline ofthe ProfessionalIdeal,37
(1985); see also Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The
Redemption ofProfessionalism?,in IDEALS/PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 230; Lon L. Fuller &
John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J.
1159, 1159 (1958) (noting a lawyer's role is justified in terms of the social functions that make
it understandable, acceptable, and even necessary).
98. See IDEALS/PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 177, 180-81; ABEL, supra note 14, at 34.
99. See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Introduction to IDEALS/PRACTICES, supra
note 67, at 15-16.
100. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Values in ProfessionalEducation,in VALUESINTEACHINGAND
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 15,25 (Carlton T. Mitchell ed., 1989); see also KOEHN, supra note 25, at
54-68 (discussing the public pledge as the ground of professional authority).
101. See APPLBAUM, supranote 26, at 48-58. For a critique of a conception ofprofessional
ethics that isolates itself from generally applicable moral values and my response to this
argument, which emphasizes the connection in most fully realized accounts of professional
ethics between professional values and common moral principles, see W. Bradley Wendel,
ProfessionalRoles and MoralAgency, 89 GEo. L.J. 667 (2001) (review essay).
STAN. L. Ruv. 565, 568
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demands of impartial justice. Thus, professionals are bound by values such as
beneficence, nonmaleficence, fidelity, and compassion. 2
The structural/functional account of sociologists is intended to be
descriptive as an explanation of how professions actually behave. It is also
possible to construct a normative version of this theory in which the social
interests served by the professions serve as the basis for justifying moral rules
that are binding on professional agents." 3 In exchange for the performance of
valuable functions by professionals, political actors in society grant to the
professions limited monopolies over the provision of services of a particular
kind.'0 ' The social values that form the grounding of professional morality are
"public" in the sense that they are presupposed by and invoked in justification
of political and moral institutions. 10 These values generate more specific
professional dutiesl(M For example, the social function of helping people
understand the law and conform their conduct to it supposedly implies an
obligation of confidentiality on the part of lawyers; if clients could not trust
their lawyers not to "rat" on them to the authorities, they would not provide
enough information for the lawyer to give informed advice on the law.' °7
Similarly, the function of lawyers to give legal advice, considered alongside the
principle that restraints on liberty, other than those imposed by law, are held to
be illegitimate in a democratic political order, generates a duty of respect for
client autonomy; lawyers should provide dispassionate advice to clients,
without attempting to sway them in one direction or another.' It is moral
arguments and principles of this type to which the remainder of this paper is
devoted. Specifically, I will now turn to the question of whether ethical
102. See Pellegrino, supra note 100, at 28; see also TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F.
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHics (4th ed. 1994).
103. See generally PAUL F. CAMENISCH, GROUNDING PROFESSIONAL ETHICS IN A
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY

(1983).

104. See id. at 29-32.

105. The connection between political values and the justification of legal judgments has
been argued vigorously by Ronald Dworkin. See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE (1985). Other works that emphasize the moral dimension ofjudging include Susan
Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 276-81 (1990); Owen Fiss, The Supreme
Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV.L. REv. 1, 29-31 (1979); Abram

Chayes, The Role of the Judge inPublic Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.REV. 1281 (1976). I have
pursued a similar line of reasoning with respect to legal ethics in W.Bradley Wendel, Public
Falues andProfessionalResponsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (1999).
106. A list of some of these public values of the profession (such as providing competent
representation and seekingjustice) and the particular norms derived from these values is set out
in the MacCrate Report. See SECTION ON LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, A.B.A.,
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 207-21
(1992) (Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap).

107. This line of inferences has been severely criticized by numerous commentators, most
persuasively by William Simon. See SIMON, supra note 15, at 54-62. 1 offer it not as an airtight
argument but as an example of how principles ofprofessional ethics can be derived from social
functions.
108. William Simon also reconstructs this argument and again demolishes it. See id. at 26-
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knowledge (such as understanding the connection between a particular social
need and moral obligations) can motivate professionals to do the right thing.
III. THE SKEPTICAL CHALLENGE TO ETHics EDUCATION

The ubiquitous judge and law professor Richard Posner recently delivered
a blistering attack on moral education in universities in the forum of the 1998
Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School.' 9 Although Posner's critique is not
particularly original, the high profile of the author and the vehemence of his
criticism of secular academic moral philosophy' 0 ensures that new attention
undoubtedly will be paid to the status of ethical knowledge and how ethics
ought to be taught in professional schools. If this argument gains wider
currency, efforts to educate lawyers as part of the professionalism movement
may come under attack from critics like Posner.
Ethics, according to Posner, is merely an accident of evolution, a human
trait that has evolved along with opposable thumbs and linguistic
competence."' Ethical claims, therefore, are susceptible only to the kind of
evaluation that would be appropriate to biological observations."' We should
praise a feature of an organism that is adaptive-that is, a feature which
enhances the probability of the species' survival given the exigencies of its
environment-and condemn as maladaptive a characteristic of an organism that
does nothing to make the continuity of a species more likely. Posner states,
"[i]nfanticide is abhorred in our culture, but routine in societies that lack the
resources to feed all the children that are born."" 3 So according to Posner, we
can confidently condemn infanticide only because we are judging from a
standpoint of great material wealth. We cannot state that infanticide is
categorically, universally, and objectively evil; the best we can say is that it is
"wrong for us" because it does not make our survival and the continuation of
our species more likely in light of our social circumstances. This is obviously
a relativistic stance, and Posner freely admits that in his view moral principles
can be judged only from within a culture: "There are no interesting moral
universals.... [A]s a practical matter, no moral code can be criticized by
appealing to norms that are valid across cultures ... ."'' He even flirts with
109. See Posner, Lectures, supra note 1. The lectures were expanded, somewhat revised,
and published as a book by the same title. See POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 14.
110. Posner's Holmes Lectures were so vitriolic that his critics in moral philosophy have
been compelled to offer psychological explanations for his visceral dislike of the discipline. See
James Ryerson, The OutrageousPragmatismofJudgeRichardPosner,LINGUA FRANCA, MayJune 2000, at 27, 33-34 (quoting Jules Coleman and Martha Nussbaum).
I 11. Posner, Lectures,supra note 1,at 1659-6 1.
112. See id.
113.Id. at 1650.
114. Id. at 1640. Moreover, as he argues, philosophical texts situated in different cultures
have nothing to say to us given the very different presuppositions of the authors, the difficulties
ofreconstructing meanings in other languages, the historical context of any argument, and so on.
See id. at 1672. Posner ignores the discipline ofhermeneutics, which seeks methods of reaching
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existentialism, confessing sympathy with the position that if a person wished
to opt out of the prevailing moral system of his culture, as did Meursault in
Camus's The Stranger,then an observer would be unable to pronounce the
agent's deeds as wrong." 5 As a result, Posner finds himself painted into some
uncomfortable comers; surprisingly, he accepts this situation with aplomb. The
Nazi genocide was wrong because it was not adaptive to the needs of German
society, he argues, and the genocide of Native Americans which accompanied
the westward expansion of the United States is less strenuously criticized
because it did serve the needs of a growing society." 6 (Notice, though, that
Posner does not say that the slaughter of the native population was not morally
wrong, although the direction of his argument implies that he would have a
hard time avoiding this conclusion.)" 7 Beyond the criterion of adaptive fitness,
however, there are no higher standards
to adjudicate differences between the
8
moral codes of different cultures.'
In his reply to critics, Posner tries to disavow some of the "radical"
statements he made in his lecture, which were seized upon by philosophers." 9
It is true that Posner repudiated what he called "vulgar relativism"-the view
that cultural differences in moral codes require cultures to enjoin a principle of
toleration of differences.' 2 He did, however, enthusiastically adopt the
relativist position that a culture can be judged only by local criteria-for
instance, we can only say, "We take Nazis to have been bad people. Of course,
the Nazis would disagree. There is nothing to which we can appeal to resolve

understanding across temporal and cultural boundaries. See generallyHANS-GEORG GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960).
115. Posner, Lectures, supra note 1, at 1643.
116. See id. at 1652.
117. Posner does not elaborate on why the Holocaust was maladaptive from the standpoint
of Nazi ideology. (Perhaps by chasing Jewish scientists to America in the pre-war years, Hitler
gutted his rocket and atomic-bomb programs and damaged the weapons-building capabilities he
needed to win the war.) I have a hard time differentiating Posner's two examples (the Holocaust
and the genocide of Native Americans) on the basis of social adaptivity. He suggests elsewhere
that our perceptions of adaptivity are colored by historical hindsight, so that if Hitler had won,
we may have evaluated his moral code differently. See id. at 1654. If that is true, then there is

nothing to the criterion of adaptive fitness that can be divorced from historical contingency. But
surely Posner does not want the analysis of the adaptivity of a moral code to depend on such
factors as whether Hitler violated his nonaggression pact with Stalin or whether he would have
permitted his generals to retreat at Stalingrad. Too many such factors unrelated to Nazi moral
principles determined the ultimate collapse of the Third Reich. The bottom line is that adaptive
fitness is a descriptive concept that does not carry over from biology to intelligible use in
morality. As Judge Noonan forcefully observes in his response to Posner, "No one I know
criticizes Hitler because after twelve years of power he came to a bad end; he is criticized
because he was a bad man doing bad deeds." John T. Noonan, Jr., Posner'sProblematics,111

HARv.L. REV. 1768, 1771 (1998).
118. See Richard A. Posner, Reply to Critics of the Problematicsof Moral and Legal
Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1796, 1799 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Reply].
119. See id. at 1819-20.
120. See Posner, Lectures, supra note 1, at 1642.
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this disagreement."' 2 ' The only thing that differentiates this position from
vulgar relativism is that it does not entail a nonrelative principle of toleration.
The United States was justified (again, by its own lights) in enforcing its moral
code by bombing and invading Germany, for example. This position does
avoid the self-refuting nature of a resolutely local moral code that nevertheless
requires a universal practice of toleration, which is itself a moral stance, but is
no less radical and objectionable. Ironically, it seems that Posner cannot avoid
slipping into nonrelative claims about science, for he argues that ethical beliefs
can be praised as adaptive or criticized as maladaptive.' 22 He has little to say
about sociobiology in his reply, suggesting that he does not take its claims
seriously, either descriptively or normatively. " But whether it is economics or
evolutionary biology, Posner is plainly impressed with the claims of natural
science to deliver "objective" knowledge'24 and believes that because moral
reasoning does not proceed along the same lines, it is incapable of reaching
some kind of final resolution.'

121. See Posner, Reply, supra note 118, at 1815 ("I no longer doubt... that one can speak
intelligibly of moral progress. But always one is speaking from a particular standpoint, rather
than sub specie aeternitatis.To us, slavery is an abomination, so we consider its abolition a mark
of progress."); see also POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 13, at 174 (arguing the religious
belief in the immorality of homosexuality and the secular liberal belief in sexual equality are
beliefs that are equally incapable of meaningful verification). It is unclear, given Posner's
guarded endorsement of subjectivism and the existentialism of Camus, whether he believes
moral judgments are relative to communities (nations, ethnic groups, etc.) or to individuals. Cf.
Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism Defended, 84 PHIL. REV. 3, 7-8 (1975) (arguing that
obligations of decency and respect for human life do not apply to Hitler because he lacked
attitudes necessary for him to have reasons to be decent and respectful of human life).
122. See Posner, Lectures,supra note 1, at 1640-42.
123. See Posner, Reply, supra note 118, at 1811-12.
124. See Posner's praise of scientific models of legal reasoning, and criticism of "soft"
accounts of legal norms, in his book version of Problematics:
For the academic lawyer, however, moral theory is an escape from having
to think of law as a form of social science orpolicy science. Law conceived
in scientific terms might have an embarrassing transparency, for legal
claims might then actually be falsifiable. Moral theory and constitutional
theory, in contrast to scientific theory, are at once opaque and spongy....
These theories are alternative mystifications to the traditional concept of
law as an autonomous and hermetic discipline.
POSNER, PROBLEMATICS,

supra note 14, at 204.

125. See Posner, Reply, supra note 118, at 1811-12. Posner's fixation on the claims of
empirical science reflects some anxiety within moral philosophy about its role vis-a-vis natural
science:
Perhaps most contemporary philosophers would agree that our going view
treats empirical science as the paradigm of synthetic knowledge, and that
an acceptable account of ethics must "place" it with respect to this
paradigm, either by effecting some sort of methodological (and perhaps
also substantive) assimilation (which might include a correction of some
stereotypes of empirical science), or by establishing a convincing contrast.
Darwall et al., supra note 39, at 126; see also Christine Korsgaard, Reflective Endorsement, in
THE SOURCES OFNoRMATIvrTY 49, 67 (Onora O'Neill ed., 1996).
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Posner's arguments for the vacuousness of moral theory are, ironically,
themselves vacuous. The diversity of cultures and the seemingly endless
variety of moral claims they have put forward is not, in and of itself, an
argument for moral relativism. 26 One may be an error theorist of morality, just
as one may subscribe to error theories of epistemology: Millions of people
believe their destinies are determined by the position of heavenly bodies,
telephone psychics can tell their fortunes, or the earth is only six thousand years
old. These people are simply wrong. Epistemological error does not mean that
true beliefs about matters of fact can never be formed or that truth claims
cannot be empirically validated. Similarly, diversity of opinion about normative
questions does not eliminate the possibility that some cultures promulgate
moral codes that are mistaken. Slavery, human sacrifice, suttee, torture,
genocide, Jim Crow laws, apartheid, religious persecution, footbinding, and
female genital mutilation are great moral evils. They are not just evils for
cultures who recognize this fact, although there may be reasons we should
evaluate people less harshly in light of their limited capacity for understanding
the wrongfulness of an act." 7 Granted, giving a metaethical account to support
this confident assertion is an involved task,'28 and it is probably true that moral
concepts are more certain in their extensions than in their meanings. It is also
likely that objectivity in the domain of moral reasoning means something
different than objectivity in natural science. Furthermore, it is a truism that
there are passionately contested moral questions about which confident
assertions of right and wrong are unwarranted-abortion, affirmative action,
and capital punishment spring to mind. But to conflate the observations of
moral diversity into a demonstration of moral relativism requires many
argumentative steps that Posner simply skips over.
Posner seeks to bolster his argument for relativism by observing that no
convincing answers to hard questions about morality exist and that an ethical
argument can generally be answered by a counterargument.'2 9 This contention
assumes what Bernard Williams has called the superpower theory of
argument-that philosophical claims succeed only if they completely annihilate
their competitors, leaving them in a pile of smoking rubble. 3 ° But a moral
argument can be a useful step on the way to a fuller understanding even though
some of its rivals still exert a gravitational pull on our reasoning. Utilitarianism

126. See, e.g., ROM HARRt &MICHAEL KRAUSZ, VARIETIES OF RELATIVISM 186-88 (1996)
("[T]he anthropological argument does not demonstrate that there are not universal principles.");
Ronald Dworkin, Darwin'sNew Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718, 1720-21 (1998) (noting
Posner seems unaware ofhow sociology or anthropology bears on moral relativism); Martha C.
Nussbaum, Still Worthy of Praise,111 HARV. L. REv. 1776, 1785-87 (1998) ("Relativism is
consequently untenable as a descriptive view, except in a form so modest that it fails to support
Posner's argument.").
127. See Dworkin, supra note 126, at 1719-20; Nussbaum, supra note 126, at 1785-86.
128. See Nussbaum, supra note 126, at 1787-91; Darwall et al., supra note 39, at 173-74.
129. Posner, Lectures, supra note 1, at 1644, 1666, 1699.
130. See WILLIAMS, supra note 36, at 84.
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and the Kantian categorical imperative both fail to account for all of our moral
intuitions, and neither can, by itself, serve as the sole grounding principle of a
decent moral order.' 3 ' However, both principles are indispensable ingredients
in an ethical system: It would be monstrous to ignore consequences altogether
(an action that would result in the death of one person is generally to be
preferred to one which would result in the death of a hundred), but it is also
necessary to give some weight to the dignity and inviolability of individual
persons (there would be something wrongful about torturing a suspect to learn
the location of a bomb planted in Times Square, even though the torture might
bejustifiable on an all-things-considered basis). Simply because a moral theory
is made up of sometimes incompatible first principles and there are occasional
conflicts among values, or difficulty in making tradeoffs between competing
values, the theory is not hopelessly subjective or impotent to provide
motivation; it merely makes working out the right action difficult in some
cases. 132
Difficult questions on the margin and the variety of possibly mistaken
moral beliefs do not establish the impossibility of evaluating moral claims
across cultural boundaries. Posner wishes to argue that if these rival values are
derived from the moral codes of incommensurable cultures, there is no
possibility of accommodating them both within a single moral code in any
meaningful way. 3 But even philosophers who believe in the strong
incommensurability thesis agree that many clashes among values can be
adjudicated rationally if there is some point of connection or common ground
between the cultures. 34 Dialogue can frequently uncover value commitments
or premises shared by the parties, which can form a starting point for
discussion. Even Israelis and Palestinians can agree on a number of moral
principles-the importance ofsovereignty over land, the centrality of religious
shrines and geography to national identity, the ideal of peaceful coexistence,
and so on. To be sure, the parties disagree about the application of these
principles to a concrete dispute, but the claims are not "incommensurable" in
the strong sense used by Posner, as a synonym for mutual unintelligibility.' 35
The parties are perfectly capable of understanding concepts like "an undivided
13 1. See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI, Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundationsof Ethics, in
MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND ETHICAL CHARACTER 32, 33 (1997).

132. See Darwall et al., supra note 39, at 178; CAVELL, supra note 36, at 254-55; T.M.
SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 198-99 (1998). It is interesting to note the parallel
between Posner's appeal to the indeterminacy of moral argument and its frequent use of paired
oppositions, on the one hand, and critical legal studies arguments about the indeterminacy of
law, on the other. See, e.g., MARKKELMAN, A GUIDETO CRTICALLEGALSTUDIES (1987). Posner
is no crit
when it comes to law, so one would expect him to have less sympathy for this style of
argument in the domain of morals.
133. Compare the similar claim by ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN
MORAL THEORY 11-12 (2d ed. 1984).

134. See, e.g., POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 14, at 113-15 (noting the existence of
some moral judgments that are widely accepted and considered moral truths).
135. See POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supranote 14, at 41.
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Jerusalem" or "authority over Jewish settlements on the West Bank," although
they disagree vehemently over each party's entitlements to interests that both
recognize as legitimate objects of pursuit. Moreover, the parties can agree in
principle on what counts as a moral argument despite their inability to agree on
a conclusion. 136 Disagreement at the level of conclusion does not mean that
moral arguments are irrational or incapable of getting off the ground; diverse
cultures frequently offer diverse moral evaluations of the same conduct, which
tends to mask a great deal of agreement on both the premises ofthe arguments
and on the procedures for conducting discussions about morality.
Posner goes on to argue that knowing principles of ethics cannot provide
a motivation for doing the right thing: "Knowing the moral thing to do does
not furnish a motivation for doing it; the motivation has to come from outside
morality.' ' 137 His argument for this proposition is not entirely clear. Perhaps it
is supposed to follow from his sociobiological understanding of ethics as being
merely a by-product of evolution. Having eyes or toes gives me no reason to
watch films or go dancing, so why should the appearance of ethical norms in
the human species give us any reason to seek good and avoid evil? Many
philosophers have noticed the difficulty in pointing to brute facts about nature
as a source of motivation to behave in one way or another. 38 The problem with
this argument is that biology is evaluatively neutral: "[T]he engine of
evolution, natural selection, is a completely dumb, intentionless process.' 39
The evolutionary pedigree of some aspect of human behavior is simply
irrelevant to whether or not it is morally obligatory, permitted, or prohibited.
Later, Posner changes tactics. He returns to his familiar economic mode and
argues for a purely instrumental understanding of rationality: If we have some
goal-for example, increasing material prosperity-then careful thinking can
help us find ways to achieve that objective." What reasoning cannot do is to
persuade others that their ends are wrongly chosen. 4 ' Posner draws a
distinction between moral philosophers, who merely construct arguments, and
"moral entrepreneurs," who have the persuasive resources (rhetorical, political,
organizational, etc.) to actually change behavior. 42 The need for moral

136. See

CAVELL,

supra note 36, at 262; JEFFREY

STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL

200-19

(1988).
137. Posner, Lectures, supra note 1, at 1641.
138. See Christine Korsgaard, The Normative Question, in THE SOURCES OFNORMATVITY,
supra note 125, at 7, 37 (citing MACKIE, supranote 5, at 38,44 and the famous "Argument from
Queerness").
139. Charles Fried, Philosophy Matters, 111 HARv.L. REV. 1739, 1749 (1998).
140. Posner, Lectures, supra note 1, at 1670.
141. This is aconventional assumption in economics and some strands ofmoral philosophy.
For example, DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986) has been challenged by
philosophers who argue that ends can be the subject of rational criticism. See, e.g., RICHARDSON,
supra note 46, at 22 (arguing that "practical reasoning" allows rational deliberation about ends);
ROBERTP. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL (1993) (arguing from a metaphysical perspective that
"practical rationality governs choice and action").
142. Posner, Lectures, supra note 1, at 1667.
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entrepreneurs arises from the countervailing effects of self-interest; as Posner
puts it, "the vast majority of us are unwilling to pay a high price in selfish joys
and comforts forgone to be good."' 43 Moral argument is also obstructed by the
emotions, which may conflict with the demands of cold rationality."4 Posner
suggests it is only the moral entrepreneur who can persuade others to modify
their ends and experience new emotions, to seek altruism instead of selfinterest, and to seek justice instead of personal advantage:
If you want to turn a meat-eater, especially a nonacademic
meat-eater, into a vegetarian, you must get him to love the
animals that we raise for food, and you cannot argue a person
into love. If you want to make a person disapprove of
torturing babies, show him a picture of a baby being tortured;
don't read him an essay on moral theory. 4
The argument rehearsed by Posner-that rightness, goodness, and justice
have no motivational force-is, of course, not new. Although many
philosophers, including Hobbes, Hume, and Butler, have wondered whether
morality and self-interest are independent, the relationship between these two
domains was famously considered in Plato's great dialogue, Republic.'4 6 The
question, why one ought to do the right thing if doing wrong were more
profitable, was posed to Socrates by two interlocutors, Thrasymachus and
Glaucon. 47 Socrates had already convinced Thrasymachus that justice was
more than merely the advantage of the stronger, 4 ' but Glaucon remained
unpersuaded that someone who could get away with injustice would act justly:
[T]hat those who practice [justice] do so unwillingly and
from want of power to commit injustice, we shall be most
likely to apprehend that ifwe entertain some such supposition
as this in thought-if we grant to both the just and the unjust
license and power to do whatever they please, and then
accompany them in imagination and see whither desire will
conduct them. We should then catch the just man in the very
act of resorting to the same conduct as the unjust man
because of the self-advantage which every creature by its
nature pursues as a good, while by the convention of law it is
forcibly diverted to paying honor to "equality."' 49

143. Id. at 1666.
144. Id. at 1672.
145. Id. at 1674.
146. PLATO, REPUBLIC (Paul Shorey trans. 1930), reprintedin THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES
OF PLATO (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
147. See id. at 11.339c-354b.
148. See id. at 11.358a-d.
149. Id. at II. 359c-d.
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Glaucon then related a story about a mythical figure who had license to commit
injustice with impunity. 5 ° A shepherd was minding his sheep one night when
a great storm and earthquake struck nearby, opening a chasm in the ground.
The shepherd went down into the chasm and discovered a magic ring, which
made him invisible when worn. He used the power of his ring to sleep with the
king's wife and eventually to kill the king and take over the kingdom,
obviously improving his life substantially. So Glaucon challenged Socrates:
Naturally, people aspire to the appearanceof justice, because of the social
approbation that the just person may obtain. But surely a just person would do
the same thing as an unjust man, if only he had the magic ring. Furthermore,
he would be crazy not to:
For that there is far more profit for him personally in injustice
than injustice is what every man believes .... For if anyone
who had got such a license within his grasp should refuse to
do any wrong or lay his hands on others' possessions, he
would be regarded as most pitiable and a great fool by all
who took note of it, though they would praise him before one
another's faces.'
Glaucon demanded that Socrates explain why one who could reap the benefits
of seeming just, without actually being just, would not live a life of injustice
like the shepherd.' s2 As Posner asks, what is the motivational force of ethics
beyond the simple fear of getting caught?" 3 Why should a lawyer not take any
action that will gain an advantage for her clients, provided that neither the
lawyer nor the client violates any applicable law? To put the question in
Glaucon's terms, granting that we all desire to appear as good people, what
reason do we have for acting rightly if we can get away with wrongdoing? 4
If Posner and Glaucon's claim about the motivational effect of ethical
knowledge is correct, the entire enterprise of teaching students (and lawyers)
about right and wrong is fundamentally misguided. Two potential responses
suggest themselves. The first is to structure ethics education around
psychological egoism and try to show people that acting rightly is in their selfinterest. (As we will see, this has been a common move by philosophers.)'
The second is to take the tack of moral entrepreneurship by using non-rational

150. Id. at 11.359c-360b.
151. Id. at 11.360c-d.
152. Id. at 11.360e-361d.
153. See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
154. See also DAVID HuME, An Enquiry ConcerningthePrinciplesofMorals, in ENQUIRIES
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 280 (L.A.

Selby-Bigge ed., 3d ed. 1975) (claiming that no theory of morals can be useful unless it shows
that the duties it enjoins are in the interests of the agent).
155. See infra Part IV.
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persuasion to change behavior. But as I will contend, Glaucon's challenge and
its contemporary analogue in Posner's argument are themselves misconceived.
IV. RESPONSES TO POSNER AND GLAUCON

Moral philosophers have traditionally drawn a sharp distinction between
reasons for acting that appeal to the agent's self-interest and "moral" reasons
for action-that is, reasons that have force despite the agent's desires. This
statement from W.D. Ross is typical: "As soon as a man does an action
because he thinks he will promote his own interests thereby, he is acting not
from a sense of its rightness but from self-interest."'5 6 This dichotomy between
moral and nonmoral motivations was most clearly realized with Kant, who
insisted that only rightly motivated actions count as moral; those done from a
sense of self-interest were not part of the domain of ethical reasoning:
Ethics concerns itself solely with disposition ....
...It is not easy to give an explanation of the exact
meaning of disposition. Take, for instance, a man who pays
his debts. He may be swayed by the fear ofbeing punished if
he defaults, or he may pay because it is right and proper that
he should. In the first case his conduct.., marks him as a
good citizen, but it is only in the latter case that
it... constitutes him a good man; for then he acts from or on
account of the inner goodness of the action, and his
disposition is moral. 7
The Kantian strategy is to find reasons for being moral that will apply
universally (or categorically, in Kant's terminology), rather than being bound
up with a given agent's culture, desires, or other contingencies.' Thus, while
it may be true that acting rightly may be in the interests of the agent and that
good people generally lead better lives than evil ones, the correspondence
between happiness and acting rightly is not necessary for there to be sound
reasons for acting morally: "To hold that the wicked never profit from their
wickedness is a view that I, as much as anyone, would prefer to be true.
Unfortunately, all of the evidence appears to show that it is false."' 59 This line

of argument is intended to meet Glaucon's challenge head-on, by convincing
the skeptic that behaving justly is mandated even where one might escape

156. W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 16 (1930).
157. IMMANUEL KANT, LECTUREs ON ETHics 71-72 (Louis Infield trans., 1979); see also
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FORTHEMETAPHYSICS OF MORALS 26 (James W. Ellington trans.,

1981) ("[W]hat is essentially good in the action consists in the mental disposition, let the
consequences be what they may.").
158. See Korsgaard, supra note 125, at 49, 89.
159. BERNARD GERT, MORALITY: ANEwJUSTIFICATION OFTHEMORALRULES 228 (1988).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol52/iss3/10

30

2001]

Wendel: Morality, Motivation, and the Professionalism Movement
THE PROFESSIONALISM MOVEMENT

criticism from one's neighbors. We can call this line of argument the nonprudentialist stance.'"
A. Non-Prudentialism
1. What We Care About
One type of non-prudentialist argument in ethics assumes that the agent is
motivated by some interest other than her own desires. In Harry Frankfurt's
terms, the agent cares about something, and this something may be used as a
reason in a moral argument.'" A person who cared about nothing other than her
own interests would be a sociopath, or at least a very bizarre individual. 62Most
people care to avoid causing needless suffering, to have people close to them
flourish, and to accurately discern the truth and act on true beliefs.'63 Of course,
people do not care only about moral rectitude; they have personal projects,
loyalties, and ideals that extend beyond the domain of the moral, and in some
cases conflict with moral reasons.16' Nevertheless, these objects are not
reducible to self-interest. They are objects of devotion and desire-things in
which we have invested ourselves-implying that there is some way in which
the objects matter in and for themselves, not merely because we desire them.'65
A person devoted to artistic excellence or intellectual achievement believes that
her activities have worth that transcends their being subjectively desired. The
difference between desires and things we care about occurs at the second order;
as Frankfurt puts it, we care about caring about things.' 66 It is somehow
constitutive of our selves, our personhood, that we commit ourselves to certain
projects or to being certain kinds of people. Thus, the person's desires are not
merely winds that blow her about, but are things with which she actively
identifies herself. This volitional step involves a self-defining commitment. The
person says, "This is who I am."
As Martha Nussbaum observes, the ancient skeptics' strategy of freeing
people from vexing questions of right and wrong produced a strange
psychological ideal: a radically detached stance and an automaton-like

160. I am using the term "prudence" to refer to acting on principles that are in the agent's
self-interest. This usage (which is common in contemporary moral philosophy) should be
distinguished from the Aristotelian usage as a translation for phronesis,or practical wisdom.
Anthony Kronman employs prudence in this sense in his book about ethical reasoning for
lawyers. See KRONMAN, supra note 2, at 209-25 (explaining prudence in the latter sense means
a faculty ofjudgment by which an agent perceives the proper mix of goods in a well-lived life).
161. See, e.g., HARRY G.FRANKFURT, The Importance of What We Care About, in THE
IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 80(1988).

162. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
163. See FRANKFURT, supra note 161, at 81.
164. Id. at 81-82.
165. Id. at 83; see also id. at 89 ("[W]hen a person is responding to a perception of

something as rational or beloved, his relationship to it tends toward selflessness.").
166. Id. at 87.
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disposition to be moved by instincts and animal drives, secure on one's Zenlike peace ofmind.'" 7 Most people do not aspire to this kind of detachment and
would consider a life bereft of cares and interests to be a less than human
existence. As soon as a person becomes embedded in the richness of
interpersonal existence, however, she acquires reasons for acting
morally-reasons that depend on the kind of beings we are and the
requirements of sociable interaction. When people start to ask questions about
ethics, it is because they believe there is something there-an answer that can
appeal to some motivation they already possess. Robert Nozick's pithy
statement captures this argument brilliantly: "When in the Republic
Thrasymachus says that justice is the interests of the stronger, and Socrates
starts to question him about this, Thrasymachus should hit Socrates over the
head.""'6 Of course, Thrasymachus and Glaucon do not hit Socrates over the
head; they listen politely, implying that they are hoping Socrates would
produce a set of reasons that they share for acting justly.'69 To return to
Frankfurt's argument, Socrates's interlocutors had already committed
themselves to being reasonable people, motivated by the right concerns. They
were looking for Socrates to show them how justice was connected with
something they cared about.
If a person cares about nothing, there is little a philosopher can do:
[I]t is very unclear that... we could argue [such a person]
into caring about something. We might indeed "give him a
reason" in the sense of finding something that he is prepared
to care about, but that is not inducing him to care by
reasoning, and it is very doubtful whether there could be any
70
such thing. What he needs is help, or hope, not reasonings.
As Williams implies, however, the person is extremely rare who cares about
nothing; indeed, we would call that person a psychopath.' 7 ' The task for ethics
education, then, is to identify what people care about and determine how
morality is related to those things. For example, if someone wishes that others
not suffer evil, he will be motivated to act morally by that reason: "One should
be moral because he will cause or increase the likelihood of someone suffering
evil if he is not."'7 Or, a person may care about acting on reasons that can be
generalized because she understands and accepts the fairness of abiding by
reciprocal obligations. 73

167. See MARTHA

C. NUSSBAUM, THE THERAPY OF DESIRE 296-98 (1994).
168. ROBERT NOZiCK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 434 (1981).
169. See PLATO, supra note 146, at 11.358a-e.

170. BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORALITY:

AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 3 (1972).
171. Id. at 8-10.
172. GERT, supranote 159, at 228.
173. See DAVID SCHMIDTZ, RATIONAL CHOICE AND MORAL AGENCY 143-45 (1995).
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Many philosophers insist that a concern for the welfare of others is
common to all rational persons: by virtue of being rational, all moral agents
care about pursuing the good, being benevolent or altruistic, telling the truth,
or keeping promises, even when it is not advantageous.174 But obviously plenty
of people live a life of self-interested detachment from the affairs of others, at
least of "remote" others not associated by familial or friendship ties. (In fact,
studies of the United States have shown a marked decline in participation in a
wide variety of civic, charitable, and social activities in recent decades.)175
These people are not, however, resolutely amoral. As Bernard Williams shows,
it is almost impossible not to subscribe to at least a minimal set of moral
duties.'" Unless someone is highly abnormal, someone else probably exists to
whom that person believes she owes certain responsibilities, such as refiaining
from causing harm and attending to certain needs.' 77 The person exhibits a
range of sympathies for those close to her-perhaps her family, friends, or
close business associates. Therefore, she has moral dispositions, such as the
desire to refrain from hurting and the desire to help those people she cares
aboutintime of need. 78 At the very least, aperson may care about realizing the
benefits of cooperation with others. Eachpartyto a bargain can share a surplus,
which would not exist in the absence of cooperation that is constrained by
moral rules. 9 These limited moral dispositions provide a purchase for moral
argumentation; for a reasoned argument may show the person that her
sympathies or the particular duties she recognizes can be generalized to apply
to others.
It may seem as though this argument invites the kind of subjectivism that
Posner so enthusiastically embraced and which I am so anxious to deny. If the
force of moral reasoning depends on what people care about and different
people care about different things, how can any moral argument apply

174. Forhistorical examples, see TAYLOR, supranote 7, at255-65, 281-83,329-31,364-67.
175. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REvIvAL OF
AMEICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (showing through data that Americans have become increasingly
disconnected from family, friends, neighbors, and social structure). The most horrific example
of the lack of concern for others is surely the case of David Cash, who did nothing to prevent his
friend from raping and murdering a seven year-old girl. His explanation for failing to act is
appalling in its extreme callousness and indifference to strangers:
[T~he simple fact remains I do not know this little girl. I do not know
starving children in Panama. I do not know people that die of disease in
Egypt. The only person I knew in this event was [my best friend] Jeremy
Strohmeyer .... I'm not going to lose sleep over somebody else's
problem.
Joshua Dressier, Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About "Bad Samaritan" Laws, 40
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 971,972 (2000) (quoting Lynda Gorov, OutrageFollows Cold Reply to
Killing, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 9, 1998, at Al).
176. See WILLIAMS, supra note 170, at 9-12.

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See GAUTHIER, supra note 141, at 11.
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universally? The crucial step here is to distinguish things that a person ought
to care about from those improperly made universal objects of commitment:
The fact that what a person cares about is a personal matter
does not entail that anything goes. It may still be possible to
distinguish between things that are worth caring
about... and things that are not.... Although people may
justifiably care about different things... this surely does not
mean that their loves and their ideals are entirely
unsusceptible to significant criticism of any sort or that no
general10 analytical principles of discrimination can be
found.
In the moral domain, there may be things that all persons ought to care about,
so that when they engage in second-order reflection ("What should I make as
the objects of my commitments?"), they will realize that they should be
committed to certain moral ideals.' 8 ' A full explanation of the nature of
evaluation ofends is beyond the scope of this Article, but I hope it is clear from
the discussion of Posner's argument that he stipulates a narrow definition of
rationality. For Posner, as for many social scientists influenced by neoclassical
economics, a desire is rational if and only if it satisfies some existing desire of
the agent.' 2 But we might wonder whether a different definition of rationality
is required when reasoning about morality; perhaps this kind of reasoning
requires questioning whether the objects of our desires are valuable or worth
desiring.
One way to make the nature of moral rationality explicit is to inquire into
thepurposesbehind moral rules. The purposes that undergird widely applicable
moral norms make reference to things that are valuable for their own sake, not
because they satisfy some contingent desire that an agent happens to have.
Moreover, these underlying purposes serve as sources of motivation for an
agent provided that two conditions are met: (1) the purposes behind the rule
are things that rational people ought to care about, and (2) the agent is inclined,
through proper training or upbringing, to care about the interests protected by
the rule. To use an analogy, imagine the following conversation:
Son:
Dad:
Son:

Dad, why do you always drive so slowly by the VMI campus
on your way to work?
Because the speed limit is 25.
Why is that the speed limit?

180. FRANKFuRTsupranote 161, at9l;seealso DAVID O. BRINK, MoRALREALISM ANDTHE
FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 64, 125-35 (1989).

18 1. See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 147-88 (1998).
182. See Posner, Lectures, supra note 1, at 1664-65.
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Because there is a lot of pedestrian traffic on this street, and
it is hard to see around the curves with all these high walls.

The chain of reasoning appeals to the purpose behind the rule-not hurting
people--which is a purpose the son is assumed to share. Consider how odd a
response would be of the form, "So what? Who cares if we run over
pedestrians?" A person who claimed not to respect the legal rule because he did
not care about refraining from hurting others wouldbe poorly socialized, to say
the least. Reasoning of this sort refers to considerations such as the fit between
the agent's desires and other ends or whether the agent is mistaken about the
objects of his conern.
The justification of a moral rule works the same way as the justification of
the legal rule described above. The demands of morality are explicated in terms
of the purposes underlying a moral rule, with the purposes generally defined
in terms of the good for some human practice."' For this reason, this form of
argument is known as teleological because it depends on the telos, or purpose,
of a social practice.8 5 Keeping one's promises, for example, can be defended
as necessary in order to support an institution of promising with its associated
expectations of performance. Similarly, marital fidelity is morally enjoined
because it is necessary to realize the goods of a monogamous union, such as
security, stability, and a deepening companionship. This teleological reasoning
process refers to the purpose of the practice in which the moral rules arise.' 86
The nature of the practice points to the reasons people have for acting rightly.
Everyone understands the point of the moral rules and follows them because
they accept the validity of the ends served by the practice. People care about
maintaining trusting relationships, refraining from hurting others, and perhaps
even about improving society and the welfare of others.
This account works well for discrete social practices whose boundaries are
clearly delineated and whose ends are widely agreed upon. When philosophers
seek to substitute "life as a whole" for particular practices, however, these
theories run into well-known difficulties. These problems are aptly summarized
in Alasdair Maclntyre's dismissal of "the dreadful banality of the true end for
man when its content is finally made known. All those remarkable virtues are
to be practiced, all that judgment and prudence is to be exercised so that we
may become-upper middle class Athenian gentlemen devoted to metaphysical
enquiry."' 7 Maclntyre and others fault contemporary ethics for lacking a
narrative, for being divorced from a richly described cultural background that
183. See Darwall et al., supra note 39, at 175-76.
184. This is what distinguishes moral reasons from taboo, an absolute or unconditional
requirement that cannot be further explicated. See Alasdair Maclntyre, CanMedicine Dispense
with a Theological Perspective on Human Nature?, in KNOWLEDGE VALUE AND BELIEF, supra
note 55, at 25, 30-31.
185. See NOZICK, supra note 168, at 494-98.
186. See id. at 497.
187. Maclntyre, supra note 184, at 38.
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provides an intelligible history for our moral commitments and values.'88 The
classic teleological theory of ethics, Aristotle's, did supply this narrative, but
its dependence on Aristotle's account of human nature renders it unsatisfactory
for grounding ethical judgments in a society that is so markedly different from
Fifth Century Athens.'89 Fortunately, professional ethics does not have a task
as comprehensive as constructing an end for life as a whole. The professions
are devoted to realizing only a subset of the goods available to a well-lived
human life and are accordingly better suited to anchoring a teleological
justification of moral rules. It is important to bear in mind Maclntyre's
criticism, however, because it points to a potential flaw in some teleological
accounts of professional ethics-namely, the tendency to identify the purpose
of the practice with one contestable vision of the good for the profession. 9 ' As
we have seen, critics of the contemporary practice of law occasionally fall
under the sway of a nostalgic longing for an imagined golden age, when the
profession was governed by wise elites.' 9' It is true that one dimension of the
lawyer's role is the preservation of social institutions and ethical traditions
against the corrosive effect of passions and discord. 92 At the same time,
however, the lawyer is supposed to be an agent of change, challenging the very
institutions that conservative visions of the profession seek to safeguard. The
difficulty for a teleological theory of professional ethics is to accommodate this
plurality of ends and to work out the balance between the occasionally
conflicting values that justify the lawyer's role. Although consideration of
conflicts in values is beyond the scope of this work, I hope that this discussion
has shown that even where the underlying values served by a profession are in
tension, the values can provide a basis for motivating agents to conduct
themselves ethically to the extent that they represent commitments that are
shared by professionals.
2. Internalism
A different kind of response to questions about the motivational force of
morality, one which has enjoyed mixed fortunes in the history of philosophy,
is moral noncognitivism-the thesis that moral judgments are expressions of
the appraiser's attitude toward some state of affairs. 93 Emotivism, one variety
ofnoncognitivism, claims that moral judgments are expressions of approval or

188. See id. at 39; see also David Burrell & Stanley Hauerwas, From System to Story: An
AlternativePatternforRationalityin Ethics, in KNOWLEDGE VALUE AND BELIEF, supranote 55,
at 111.
189. See Darwall et al., supra note 39, at 168.
190. See Maclntyre, supra note 184, at 28-31.
191. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
192. See Anthony T. Krornan,Alexander Bickel's PhilosophyofPrudence,94 YALE L.J.
1567 (1985); Anthony T. Kronman, Precedentand Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990).
193. See, e.g., BRINK, supra note 180, at 44 (describing, but not approving of,
noncognitivist positions).
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disapproval, or moral judgments are dispositions to particular emotional

reactions given the state of affairs; it has been mocked as the "Yay! Boo!"
theory of morality and has come in for sustained, and I believe persuasive,
criticism."" A more plausible version of noncognitivism, prescriptivism,
maintains that a moral judgment is the speaker's assertion that an evaluation or
recommendation ought to be concurred in by others. 9 Notably, both variants
of the noncognitivist claim share the virtue of building motivation into moral
concepts." David Brink, who has written the best recent study of the
relationship between motivation and morality, labels "internalism" the claim
that "it is a part of the concept of a moral consideration that such considerations
motivate the agent to perform the moral action or provide the agent with reason
to perform the moral action."'" The problem with the internalist stance is that
it can be easily shown that not everyone is motivated by moral reasons. A
committed internalist could reply to this objection by denying that it is
conceptually possible to fail to be motivated by moral reasons; if people were
not moved by X to do Y, then it would follow that X is not a moral reason for
Y. In other words, an internalist must refuse to accept the existence of amoral
people-those who recognize moral reasons for what they are, but nevertheless
refuse to perform moral actions."' What is the internalist to do with Glaucon
and Thrasymachus, or Judge Posner for that matter?
For this reason, the motivational force of morality may be held to depend
on contingent psychological factors, such as the beliefs and desires that an
agent happens to have or internalized dispositions. 199 In this view, a reason to

194. See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 133, at 11-21 (defining and criticizing emotivism);
see also DWORK]N, supra note 105, at 173 (stating "the redescription of [philosophers'] moral
beliefs as emotional reactions is just bad reporting"); Darwall et al., supra note 39, at 149-50.
195. The best-known statement of this position is R.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS
1-16 (1952). See also CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE 24 (1944). For a
sophisticated recent example, see ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APTFEELINGS 30-35 (1990).
Both versions of noncognitivism were displaced in the second half of the twentieth century by
substantive theories such as John Rawls's method of reflective equilibrium. See Darwall et al.,
supra note 39, at 123. For an intriguing revival of noncognitivism, consider the expressivist
movement in law, which tells legal actors to express appropriate attitudes toward values. See
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000).
196. See, e.g., BINK, supra note 180, at 39.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 46-47.
199. Brink calls this position "externalism," to contrast with internalism. See id. at 42. To
make matters confusing, Bernard Williams has adopted different meanings for internalism and
externalism. See BERNARDWILLIAMS, InternalandExternal Reasons, in MORAL LUCK 101, 101
(1981). For Williams, external reasons are those which do not depend on the agent's actual
subjective motivations. Id. at 106-08. Internal reasons are those which make reference to
interests and motivations that the agent happens to have. Id. at 10 1-02. In Brink's terminology,
however, some of these reasons may be external in the sense that they make reference to the
agent's desires and are not motivational solely by virtue of being requirements ofmorality. See
BRINK, supra note 180, at 48-50. I will track Brink's definitions ofinternalism and externalism
in this paper. See alsoKorsgaard, supra note 125, at 81 (following Brink's sense ofinternalism).
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behave morally must depend on some motive or desire that the agent has for its
force, which will be furtheredby his taking the prescribed action. InFrankfurt's
terms, morality must be connected with something the agent cares about,
although it is unnecessary to care for any particular thing.2" We can imagine
a person who cares about none of the considerations that ordinarily motivate
people to be moral, such as sympathy, benevolence, or justice. As Brink
observes, we can still argue that an amoral person is wrong and that she ought
to care about certain interests; such an amoralist is, however, conceptually
possible."' Furthermore, while the things we care about may be reasons for
action, they need not be conclusive reasons-they may be outweighed by other
desires or interests, or we may be too lazy or weak of will to act on these
reasons. Moral reasons need not be sufficient reasons for action in order to
count as moral reasons.202 This is an error into which Posner slips inhis Holmes
Lectures. Much of his argument for the ineffectiveness of moral theory is
centered on the inability of moral argument to motivate some people, some of
the time. 0 3 But no one claims that a moral argument must be decisive in every
case. Motivation may depend on contingent psychological factors, such as
whether a person cares about concerns that ought to motivate her. The
existence of an amoralist-someone who responds "so what?" when presented
with moral reasons for action-is not an embarrassment to morality; it is an
indictment ofthe rationality, education, socialization, or character ofthe person
in question. Most people have reasons for action that depend on commitments,
loyalties, or aspects oftheir personal identity which they are not willing or able
to give up easily, or stand aside from, in the posture of the hypothetical
amoralist critic.
An argument like this one has been developed with great sophistication by
the neo-Kantian philosopher Christine Korsgaard. 2 4 She observed that it is part
of the nature of human beings to be reflectively self-conscious.2 5 We have
desires, drives, and inclinations, but unlike animals who simply act on these
whims, we can subject them to examination, asking whether these desires are
good reasons for acting. When we deliberate about actions, we realize we must
decide for a reason, because the will, in order to be free, must act under a law
that it makes for itself.2" The familiar Kantian categorical imperative arises

200. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
201. See BRINK, supranote 180, at 48-50.
202. See id. at 60.
203. See supranote 137 and accompanying text.
204. See CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS (1996); Korsgaard,
supranote 125. This section of the Article largely tracks Korsgaard's lecture, The Authority of
Reflection, in THE SOURCES OF NORMATIViTY 90 (Onora O'Neill ed., 1996). I will ignore
variations between this argument and some ofthe essays in Creatingthe Kingdom ofEnds as the
differences are not relevant for the purposes of this Article.
205. See Korsgaard, The Authority of Reflection, supra note 204, at 92.
206. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Sel A
Reply to Ginsborg, Guyer, and Schneewind, 109 ETHICS 49, 50-52 (1998).
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here-a free will must choose a law-like maxim for action. °7 However, the
next step of the argument is highly original: The will does not deliberate in a
vacuum. Rather the structure of reflective self-consciousness forces us to
construct a conception of personal identity. "When you deliberate, it is as if
there were something over and above all of your desires, something which is
you, and which chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle
or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being
expressive of yourself."2' 8 Self-identity is the principle of choice for the free
will.' Significantly, personal identity must be understood at a relatively low
level of abstraction. Although we are all citizens of the "Kingdom of Ends," by
virtue of being human beings, we also bear particularized identities. A person
may "think of herself as someone's friend or lover, or as a member of a family
or an ethnic group or nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her
own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as
the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton."21 This kind of
conception of oneself, which Korsgaard calls an agent's "practical identity," is
a way of valuing oneself--"a description under which you find your life to be
worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. 2.'
Normativity-that is, the binding nature of principles of action-is built
into this account because violating the conception of oneself that forms the
basis of one's practical identity is intolerable. We express this sort of reasoning
in ordinary life when we say, "I couldn't live with myself if I did that," or teach

207. See id. at 51.
208. Korsgaard, The Authority of Reflection, supra note 204, at 100.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 101. The term "wanton" is derived from Harry Frankfurt's paper, Freedom of
the Will and the Concept ofa Person,in THE IMPORTANCE OF WHATWE CARE ABOUT, supranote
16 1, at 11. Note that simply being awanton, as opposed to deciding to live as a wanton, is ruled
out by the nature of the will. One of Korsgaard's critics gives a good account of why this is so:
"If the will adopts some other law, notably the law of always choosing what the person desires,
then it abandons its position of freedom by putting itself under the constraint of desires and
inclinations that are alien to it." Hannah Ginsborg, KorsgaardonChoosingNonmoralEnds, 109
ETHics 5, 8 (1998). Ginsborg overstates a bit here; it is possible to have some second-order
desire to live as a wanton-that would still be an autonomous principle of the will. The only
thing ruled out by the nature of the will is abandoning second-order reasons altogether, and
permitting oneself to be simply blown about by first-order desires.
211.Korsgaard, The Authority ofReflection, supranote 204, at 101. Later in The Authority
ofReflection Korsgaard seems to adopt the criticism made by communitarian critics like Michael
Sandel of some versions of political liberalism, namely that liberalism posits a deracinated
conception of the self that does not provide a sufficiently rich practical identity to enable the
agent to make decisions. See id. at 118-19 (citing MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE
LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982)). "[W]e may begin by accepting something like the communitarian
point. It is necessary to have some conception ofyour practical identity, for without it you cannot
have reasons to act." Id. at 120. It is interesting that she equates "practical identity" with the
particularized, culture-bound conception of the self described by Sandel, and not with simply
being human. There is some similarity here, I think, with the claim of Maclntyre, discussed
above, that ethics detached from narrative is incoherent. See supra notes 183-84 and
accompanying text.
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children that they should not lie because if they did they would be liars. "Your
reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what
that identity forbids. ' 21 2 Much of one's practical identity is contingent; it
depends on the race, sex, geographic region, and religion into which one is
born, as well as choices made in one's life, such as entering an occupation or
adopting orrepudiating some aspect of one's socialbackground. (As Korsgaard
notes, falling in love with a Capulet might make one realize that being a
Montague is not all that important. On the other hand, a person may choose to
emphasize some aspect of her identity which had until that point been less
important, by accepting a religious vocation, for example.) 2 3 What is not
contingent for Korsgaard, however, is that we are governed by
some conception of practical identity. "For unless you are committed to some
conception of your practical identity, you will lose your grip on yourself as
having any reason to do one thing rather than another-and
214 with it, your grip
on yourself as having any reason to live and act at all."
The implication for professional ethics ofthis account should be clear. To
the extent that a person's professional identity is important to herself, it
furnishes a reason for action. Professions are a natural foundation for personal
identity, particularly in light of the leveling effects of mass culture and
technology on traditional sources of meaning, such as religion, family, region,
and in some cases ethnicity."5 Moreover, as William Simon, Mike Martin, and
others have argued, professionals seek meaning in their occupations; it is the
nature of professions to make normative claims and the nature of professionals
to believe they are engaging in a meaningful project. 2 6 Finally, the need for
locating meaning in professional life is bound to increase as work occupies
more and more of one's time. As Anthony Kronman points out, modem law
firm practice leaves very little time remaining in the week for family, social,
religious, artistic, and charitable activities that would otherwise function as a
basis for one's personal identity. Thus, to the extent Korsgaard is correct, and
humans need particularized identities as a ground of reasons for action, we can
expect professionals to freight their careers with normative significance. Unless
the legal profession is completely incapable of bearing this weight (and I do not
think this is the case), it is possible to use the moral value that lawyers seek
from their profession as a way to get the ethical argument started. Some
suggestions for how these arguments might proceed are found in Section V.

212. Korsgaard, The Authority ofReflection, supranote 204, at 101.
213. Id. at 120.
214. Id. at 120-21.
215. This claim is often associated with Durkheim. See EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL
ETHics AND CIVIL MORALS (Cornelia Brookfield trans., 1958).
216. MARTIN, supra note 34; SIMON, supranote 15, at 109-37.
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B. Ducking the Question: Morality and Prudence
Some philosophers have sought to make an end-run around Glaucon's
challenge, by denying that acting immorally can ever be in one's self-interest.
They seek to show that the belief that there is advantage in injustice is
mistaken. The great historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin describes this tradition:
According to this doctrine-that virtue is knowledge-when
men commit crimes they do so because they are in error: they
have mistaken what will, in fact, profit them. If they truly
knew what would profit them, they would not do these
destructive things-acts which must end by destroying the
actor, by frustrating his true ends as a human being, by
blocking the proper development of his faculties and powers.
Crime, vice, imperfection, misery, all arise from ignorance
and mental indolence or muddle.217
This argumentative move is common in professional ethics, where the practical
downside of getting caught acting immorally is often clear. Alan Goldman, for
example, explains that it is not in the long-run best interests of a corporation to
cut corners on safety: "When a corporation blatantly ignores potential harm to
the public from the marketing of its product, it can expect not only losses on
that product when the harmful defect is discovered, but negative publicity that
can affect the sales of its other products as well."2 18 (This strategy is known in
legal education as "fighting the hypothetical"--a favorite tactic of law students.
Its maxim may be stated as: When faced with an inconvenient question,
modify it until it can be answered.) If morality is considered in a gametheoretic context, moral norms can solve collective action problems and ensure
cooperation, where defecting from cooperativeness would be detrimental to all
participants.219 By making this move, however, morality becomes assimilated
to self-interest, or prudence, because it assumes that all participants in a social
practice, or players in a game, are concerned only to maximize their own
advantage.
We can call this rephrasing of Glaucon's challenge the "prudentialist
stance." It represents a partial capitulation to a critic like Posner, for it accepts
the centrality of self-interest as a motivating principle for humans.22

217. ISAIAH BERLIN, The Decline of UtopianIdeas in the West, in THE CROOKED TIMBER

OF HUMANITY 20, 28-29 (Henry Hardy ed., 1990).
218. ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs 233 (1980).
219. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 136-39 (1984).
220. Posner tries to head off this move by definition-he defines morality as the set of
duties designed to check our self-interest. See Posner, Lectures,supranote 1,at 1639. But ifselfinterest and morality are never opposed, there is no need to define and defend a separate sphere
ofmoral duties. To turn the point around, if reasons must be ruled out as "moral" whenever they
coincide with the agent's self-interest, there may be no moral reasons at all, ifmorality turns out
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Prudentialism merely reconceives certain kinds of moral duties (or the totality
of morality, depending on the strength of the prudentialist claims advanced) as
having a basis in self-interest.
David Schmidtz observes that morality and prudence can have overlapping
extensions." That is, doing X might be the right thing to do based on nonprudential reasons, but it also might be in the best interests of the agent. To take
familiar examples, civic volunteering may alleviate human suffering, but also
improve the reputation of the volunteer in the eyes of the community. Voting,
refraining from racial discrimination, keeping one's promises, and remaining
loyal to one's spouse are all moral imperatives, but also function as signals to
potential cooperative partners of the agent's reliability; moral reasons for acting
are therefore buttressed by prudential reasons to behave in the same manner.222
Similarly, a person may have profoundly moral reasons for doing X, but these
reasons may nevertheless satisfy some interest the person has. Michael Perry
gives an example of a religious person who gives money for famine relief
because she has internalized the Christian imperative to "love one another just
as I have loved you. ' ' 3 If someone like Posner were to push this justification
and ask why this person had internalized this Biblical precept, she might
answer, "[b]ecause [this is) the way to live the most deeply satisfying life of
which human beings... are capable."2 This reason certainly appeals to the
agent's self-interest, but it is also a moral reason, in that it makes reference to
the welfare of others and is ajudgment about how one ought to act to express
Christian love. (Perry assumes that the person in his story did not act merely
out of fear of eternal damnation, which would be a non-moral reason.) 225 The
entanglement of self-interest with these motivations does not remove the action
from the domain of the moral. Attempting to live one's life in conformity with
religious ideals, or a secular understanding of the fundamental existential
conditions of human life, is the very heart of the moral enterprise.
These possibilities do not mean that morality is merely a matter of selfinterest. Indeed, the questions of whether X is moral and whether X is in one's
self-interest are analytically distinct questions. "Whether or not moral
imperatives are categorical, there remains a fact of the matter concerning
whether following moral imperatives is to our advantage. To try to show that
being moral turns out to be prudent is not to assume that moral imperatives are
prudential imperatives.""us The possibility of extensional overlap shows how

to be in the interest of all rational, properly informed persons.
221. See SCHMIDTZsupra note 173, at 132-33.
222. See ERIc A. POSNER, LAW AND SociAL NORMs (2000).
223. Michael J. Perry, Gianella Lecture, What is "Morality"Anyway?,45 VILL.L.REV. 69,

76 (2000).
224. See id. at 76.
225. See id. at 77-78.
226. SCHMIDTZ,supra note 173, at 132; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 169, at 76 ("[Ilt is
quite unrealistic to force onto our religious moralist (or anyone else) an exclusive disjunction
between the prudential and the moral.").
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Glaucon's challenge can be misconstrued. 7 Perhaps Glaucon was asking only
whether he had non-moral reasons to regretacting morally. His question, so
understood, was not a demand that Socrates show him that right action would
always be in his self-interest. Similarly, professionals who ask whether it is in
their self-interest to act morally might be wondering whether they will bear
some cost as a result of doing the right thing. The question does not, however,
mean that they are unwilling to behave morally. Just as the strong intemalist
claim (moral reasons always motivate) is false because it fails to allow for
people who recognize the moral option but refuse to abide by it, the strong
prudentialist claim is false because it denies that someone may act morally
when it is not in her self-interest.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM
A. Meaningful Work
The first response that may be made to the Posner/Glaucon position is that
it does not represent the standpoint from which most well-socialized
professionals ask questions about their obligations. Law students and lawyers
who ask questions about professional ethics are not stating their unwillingness
to take morality seriously; they are asking for reasons that are connected with
what they already care about. What they care about, in many cases, turns out
to be an ethically meaningful occupation. The aspiration to belong to a
profession whose social meaning corresponds to the moral longings of its
practitioners is the motivating force for lawyers, and this reasoning gives
purchase to the ethical arguments offered by educators and critics.
Two of the most significant recent works on legal ethics begin by
observing the pervasive malaise among practicing lawyers. "No social role
encourages such ambitious moral aspirations as the lawyer's, and no social role
so consistently disappoints the aspirations it encourages," writes William
Simon in The PracticeofJustice." Anthony Kronman begins his book, The
Lost Lawyer, by noting "doubts about the capacity of a lawyer's life to offer
fulfillment to the person who takes it up."' 9 The cause of this dissatisfaction,
according to both scholars, is the disjunction between the moral principles that
give meaning, both personal and social, to the practice of law and the
contemporary legal workplace, which gives very little weight to ethical matters
other than a narrow range of norms such as confidentiality and loyalty to one's
clients. 2 0 According to Simon, in contemporary practice lawyers have become
alienated from the moral sources that formerly gave meaning to their
professional lives, with the result that their work now seems meaningless and

227. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
228. SIMON,supra note 15, at 1.
229. KRONMAN, supra note 2, at 2.
230. See id. at 2-3; SIMoN, supra note 15, at 1-4.
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empty."I Where formerly lawyers had been able to exercise considerable
autonomy to adapt social values to the particulars of their clients' needs, the
bureaucratization of law practice, with its emphasis on narrow specialization
and highly technical problem-solving, has reduced these opportunities to
undertake creative, normatively significant professional projects."
Simon's solution to this problem is to recognize that lawyers bear more
moral responsibility for the ends and means of their representation of clients
than has formerly been acknowledged.233 This critique sounds
pessimistic-lawyers have been evading responsibility, so blame should now
be placed where it belongs. However, there is a positive side to this argument:
the potential for greater self-realization and the exercise of lawyers' moral
agency that may be tapped when the moral responsibilities of professionals are
rightly understood. Similarly, Mike Martin argues that professionals may be
motivated by moral concerns in addition to the obvious interest that all people
have in making money at their jobs. 4 "Professions provide opportunities to
make ongoing contributions to the well-being of others,""23 and it is this
opportunity that attracts many young people to professional careers. For
example, would-be doctors talk about the importance of healing, and law
school applicants invariably discuss concerns with justice and their desire to
help people on the personal statement included with their applications for
admissionY 6 The closing of these avenues for self-realization may be what
underlies much ofthe phenomenon of dissatisfaction by practicing lawyers, and
if that is so, one can imagine reducing professional malaise by restoring the
connection between the social values that provide moral sources to practitioners
and the actual conditions of occupational life.
Recall the example of the legal rule whose justification was avoiding harm
to pedestrians. It would be odd to think of someone saying, "I do not need to
pay attention to the rule because I do not care about running people over."
Similarly, it seems peculiar to imagine a lawyer saying, "I can ignore ethical
considerations in my professional life, because I do not really care about
justice." Of course, the relationship between justice concerns and actions by
lawyers may be attenuated and difficult to discern. A lawyer may believe in a
strongly role-differentiated conception of legal ethics, in which justice is held
to emerge from the partisan activities of lawyers on both sides, with a judge

231. See SIMON, supra note 15, at 111-26.
232. See id. at 112-13.
233. See id. at 112.
234. See MARTIN, supra note 34, at 23.
235. Id.
236. The reality may be less inspiring. Patrick Schiltz writes that most lawyers, at least
those at big firms, are basically greedy, insecure, and competitive. See Schiltz, supra note 2, at
910-20. They tend to grasp instinctively for any brass ring dangled in their presence, keep score
by comparing the amount of money they make with others, and fall into workaholism all too
easily. As a result, for many big-firm lawyers, moral concerns become marginalized and ethics
are reduced to complying with the technical law of professional responsibility.
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serving as a neutral referee. On this model, what seem like justice-subverting
activities may be, to the lawyer, activities that further justice in the long run,
provided that the adversary system mechanism is properly set up and
maintained. 237 Familiar examples include cross-examination that casts doubt on
a truthful witness's testimony and procedural stratagems that prevent a
substantively valid claim from being considered by the tribunal. But even a
lawyer who subscribes to a strongly role-differentiated conception is still
concerned to justify her activities with reference to the purpose underlying the
practice. It is difficult to imagine a lawyer saying, "Frankly, I filed that
suppression motion because I wanted to make money, and I charge by the
hour." Rather, a lawyer participating in a conversation about professional
morality would relate her actions back to underlying values: "I filed the
suppression motion because the police officers searched my client without a
warrant and without consent; the exclusion of evidence in this case is justified
because in the long run it is the only way to deter police misconduct."
Although it is hard to evaluate ethical reasoning with much precision,
empirical studies have revealed that lawyers generally resort to arguments like
this one to justify their activities. For example, the ABA recently sponsored an
interview-based, interdisciplinary study of the ethics of large firm litigators."a
Lawyers' reasoning relied heavily on the adversarial norm, or what Simon calls
considerations of long-runjustice. 3 For example, with respect to the discovery
process, lawyers' justifications tended to take the following form: "You stay
within the rules; to the extent it's within the rules, you have a duty to do
everything you can for the client's interests., 24' This reasoning may be
faulty-much of current legal ethics scholarship is dedicated to debunking
arguments of this form-but it is nevertheless a moral position, justified by the
relative competence of decisionmakers (lawyers, judges, clients, drafters of
rules) to make ethical decisions and the long-run incentive effects that would
result if each player in the system deviated from her assigned role. The
significance of the findings of the ABA study lies not in the persuasiveness of
the arguments adduced by the lawyers, but in the seriousness with which the
study's respondents took their obligation to offer good moral reasons for their
conduct. The lawyers did not say, "Yeah, I'm a whore. I'm only in it for the
money." The justifications they offered related to considerations of justice,
fairness, political legitimacy, and loyalty to clients, along with some armchair

237. Forpersuasive criticisms ofthe "adversary system excuse," see APPLBAuM, supranote
26, at 3-14; DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: ANETHICAL STUDY 148-56 (1988); see also
SIMON, supra note 15, at 62-68. I offer this argument not as one that I personally endorse, but

as an example of how the connection between the purpose behind a practice (here, justice), and
rules of the practice may be attenuated.
238. See Lawrence J. Fox et al.,
Report, Ethics: Beyond the Rules: HistoricalPreface, 67
FORDHAM L. REV.691, 691 (1998).
239. See SIMON, supra note 15, at 53.
240. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-FirmLitigators: Preliminary
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 710 (1998).
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empiricism about the effectiveness of the adversary system. 24 ' These are by no
means the kind of amoralists whose views would lend support to Posner's
critique of moral reasoning.242
Of course, there may be some recalcitrant lawyers who are resolutely
amoral. For lawyers who simply refuse to pay any heed to ethical reasoning,
there is little that any educational efforts associated with the professionalism
movement, no matter how well conceived, can do. Consider this cynical
comment by White House counsel John Dean on his role in the Watergate
scandal: "I knew that the things I was doing were wrong, and one learns the
difference between right and wrong long before one enters law school. A
course in legal ethics wouldn't have changed anything." 3 He is probably right,
and for this reason, professional responsibility courses ought not to be aimed
at the John Deans of the world. These lawyers are probably motivated by little
other than the fear of getting caught, so the best we can do is to appeal to those
motivations: "There is much we can do in society, ranging from attempts at
persuasion to punishment of the person who does not behave morally, by
connecting sanctions to motivations he does have. ' '2' The following subsection
considers a limited place for prudential, or self-regarding arguments, in
professional ethics.
B. "They're Kids... Scare Them ,245: A Limited Rolefor Prudentialism
The alternative response to the skeptical argument is in one sense a dodge:
In most real-world cases, acting rightly, helping one's clients, and self-interest
are not in tension. As one might say to Glaucon, in the real world of law
practice there are no magic rings lying around to prevent a lawyer from
acquiring a reputation for injustice. 2' This argument is a surrender to critics
like Posner, for it relies on proving a congruence between doing the right thing
and acting in one's self-interest and in the interest of one's clients. 247 But

241. See id.
242. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
243. Thomas Lickona, WhatDoesMoralPsychologyHave to Say to the TeacherofEthics?,
in ETHICS TEACHING INHIGHEREDUCATION 103,129 (Daniel Callahan & Sissela Bok eds., 1980)
(quoting D. Goldman, "Exclusive Interview with John Dean," Comment, Boston University
School of Law 1 (1979)).
244. NOZICK, supra note 168, at 411.
245. This line is from the movie Bull Durham and represents jaded catcher Crash Davis's
response to his manager's desperate plea for any suggestions to improve the team's lousy
performance. The manager's memorable locker-room tirade follows: "This is a simple
game-you throw the ball, you catch the ball, you hit the ball." BULL DURHAM (Image
Entertainment 1988).
246. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
247. I am assuming here that lawyer self-interest and the interest of the lawyers' clients
generally coincide. Many ethical dilemmas addressed by the professionalism movement concern
cases in which the client's interest conflicts with some other interest, such as that of a third party,
opposing lawyer, court, agency, or society at large. There are, however, cases in which the
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showing students how conforming to standards of professional morality can
help their clients' causes is also a reflection of the reality of our endeavor. In
most situations, unethical behavior that seems to be in the best interest of
clients in the short run will have a long-term detrimental impact on the client's
case or business transaction, to say nothing of the lawyer's reputation and
effectiveness. To communicate this message, however, teachers ofprofessional
ethics must challenge a persistent theme in the tradition of the American legal
profession-the myth that being a complete jerk is the path to success.
Consider this statement about mergers and acquisitions practice in New York
City:
Legal ethics becomes a paradoxical element of
competition among lawyers: Those who practice closest to
the line without crossing seem to gain an advantage. Goaded
by the market, conscientious lawyers ask whether they do
their clients a disservice if they don't exploit every opening.
Some legal scholars warn that any lawyers who don't reach
the limit are in breach of their professional obligations.24
This view may be called the Rambo narrative. It is pervasive among practicing
lawyers, as sociologists have discovered,24 9 and it appears to be an attitude that
law students somehow pick up from the fragments of cultural messages about
lawyers that they encounter prior to law school. One way to counteract the
Rambo narrative is to show that this style of lawyering is counterproductive
and the clients of the would-be Rambos are better off with a representative
conforming to the dictates of professionalism. It is the responsibility ofjudges,
practicing lawyers, and law teachers to recount stories in which doing the right
thing and the interests of clients coincide.
This section is entitled "They're kids.. ." to reflect the viewpoint of a legal
educator, but the same lessons still need to be taught to some practitioners,
particularly those early in their careers. The Rambo narrative does not get
started in law school; the students may have a distorted view of the ethics of
lawyers, but the mythology of take-no-prisoners lawyering has a basis in the

lawyer's self-interest and the client's interests diverge. Examples include the incentives created
by hourly billing and the conflict ofinterest built into settlement negotiations in contingency-fee
cases. Throughout this section, where I speak of client interests and lawyer self-interest, I will
be assuming they are harmonious, but the same arguments apply, mutatis mutandis, to cases in
which they conflict. (I am grateful to Peter Strauss for raising this objection in related contexts.)
248. LINcoLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN: POWER, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF ALEGAL EMPIRE 138

(1993).
249. See Gordon, supra note 240, at 716 (reporting on conclusion of ABA study of large
law firm litigation practice that "there were few positive incentives, other than self-respect and
the good opinion of judges and of lawyers from other firms to practice ethically"); Mark C.
Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology ofLegal Ethics in CorporateLitigation, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 837 (1998).
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beliefs of many members of the bar. The pervasiveness of the Rambo narrative
can be perceived not only from sociological studies like the ABA's study of
big-firm litigators referred to above, but also from the growing number of
articles by frustrated judges and experienced lawyers, cautioning their
overzealous peers against becoming too enthralled with thejunkyard dog ideal.
Judges have begun to come forward to warn lawyers that unethical
behavior may compromise their clients' cases. For example, federal judge Alex
Kozinski has written a humorous how-to guide for advocates hell-bent on
losing an appeal.2 s0 Here is an example of one of the losing tactics he suggests:
Best of all, cheat on the page limit. The Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure not only limit the length of the briefs,
but also indicate the type size to be used. This was pretty easy
to police when there were two type sizes-pica and elite. But
these days it is possible to create almost infinite gradations in
size of type, the spacing between letters, the spacing between
lines and the size of the margins.
...Chiseling on the type size and such.., tells the
judges that the lawyer is the type of sleazeball who is willing
to cheat on a small procedural rule and therefore probably
will lie about the record or forget to cite controlling
authority."
The rule cited by Judge Kozinski is an extremely trivial one, and he emphasizes
its pedestrian nature by citing it along with numerous other pet peeves, such as
the excessive use of acronyms and legal jargon in briefs. 5 2 But there is a
serious point underlying this example: Ethical lapses have consequences in the
real world of legal practice. Showing oneself to be a "sleazeball," in Judge
Kozinski's words, may cost an advocate crucial credibility, and the client the
case.
The previous discussion should not be overstated as no lawyer is going to
fail to enter heaven for bending procedural rules, just as no one will suffer
eternal perdition for exceeding speed limits or removing those little tags from
mattresses. An excellent brief will not suddenly turn into a sure loser just
because the lawyer tried to sneak a few extra words past a busy appellate court.
However, these sorts of infractions tend to be cumulative." 3 A lawyer who
cheats on one little rule is more likely to cheat on another.2 S4 Over time, this
250. Alex Kozinski, The Wrong Stuff, 1992 BYU L. REV. 325 (1992).
251. Id. at 327.
252. See id. at 328.
253. Compare SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 24-26
(1978), on the cumulative effect of telling lies on the liar's character, with Schiltz, supra note
2, at 917 on the corrosive effect that billing fraud has on lawyers' ability to perceive unethical
conduct.
254. See Kozinski, supra note 250, at 328.
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habit of cutting ethical comers may diminish the lawyer's resolve to do the
right thing where the lawyer experiences intense pressure to cheat. Judges
know this and are suspicious of a lawyer's integrity even where the only
evidence known to the judge is that the lawyer cheated on an inconsequential
rule.
In all but the simplest cases, the lawyers know far more about the
particulars of the law than does the judge. Certainly the advocates are much
more familiar with the factual record than the judge because the lawyers have
been living with the case, so to speak, for months or years. As a result of this
asymmetry of information, judges are in the position of a rather uninformed
purchaser of some product." In most markets, there are mechanisms such as
third-party auditors to increase the reliability of information." 6 In litigation, by
contrast, we have only the adversary system, in which we trust the opposing
lawyers to ferret out weak legal arguments and unsupported factual assertions.
For this reason, judges assess the reliability of information through informal
means. In smaller communities, they learn the reputations of lawyers for
honesty and fair dealing through the grapevine. In large markets, where the cost
of obtaining such information is high, judges may make judgments about the
lawyer's integrity based on the available evidence. If submissions to the court
are essentially accurate and candid, the lawyer gains credibility. If the lawyer
has stretched the holding of a case too far or mischaracterized facts in the
record, the judge may assume that the lawyer is not to be trusted.
The advantages of maintaining the confidence of the court are well known
to experienced advocates 7 but may not be obvious to beginning law students.
New lawyers may not realize that judicial personnel do not do much
independent research; they rely on lawyers to explain the legal framework, cite
the right cases, not stretch the authority, and apply the law to the facts.
"[J]udges must depend to some extent on counsel to bring issues into focus."" 8
Certainly most judges bring a wealth of experience to the bench, which results
in their fairly reliable gut reactions to legal arguments. Law clerks may do
some additional research at the direction of their judge, especially if one of the
parties' lawyers has done a lousy job briefing an issue that may be dispositive
of the case. However, when issuing dispositions, judges do not construct legal
arguments from the ground up. They need lawyers to guide them through the
analysis of the case. Naturally, they want to make sure that the guidance they

255. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Adversary Inferences, 20 HARv. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 503, 503 (1996).
256. See id. at 506.
257. The literature for practitioners is full of articles that caution lawyers not to stretch the
truth and to bejealous of their credibility. See, e.g., Andrew L. Frey and Roy T. Englert, Jr., How
to Write a GoodAppellate Brief,LITIG., Winter 1994, at 6, 6-7; Richard B. Klein,A Dozen Ways
to Anger a Judge, LITIG., Winter 1987, at 5 (stressing the importance of lawyers' realizing and
avoiding behavior that angers judges); Warren E. Burger, StandardsofConductforProsecution
and Defense Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11, 13 (1966).
258. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 176-77 (1975).
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receive is reliable. Judges expect lawyers not only to be partisan, but also to be
fair. They will not pay much attention to a lawyer who seems untrustworthy.
Thus, a lawyer who tries to stretch a case too far runs the risk of alienating the
judge and conceding to her adversary the crucial role of establishing the legal
framework for deciding the case. As Ninth Circuit Judge Harry Pregerson has
written:
Finally, make sure you do not mischaracterize the
holdings of cases you cite. We do read the cases. If you are
using a case as an analogy, point that out. If, under the guise
of aggressive advocacy, you misuse a case or fail to discuss
an unfavorable holding, you lose credibility. And your
credibility is a critical item of your stock in trade.25 9
When the audience for professionalism education is broadened beyond law
students, however, this sort of advice tends to sound patronizing to experienced
lawyers. Nevertheless, there may be value in repeating it, particularly if the
speaker is a judge who can remind lawyers of the importance of credibility in
the courtroom.
The preceding example suggests an ordinary, everyday way that unethical
law practice can be contrary to one's self-interest. More serious breaches of
professional obligations can result in proportionately graver adverse
consequences. The Kodak-Berkey Photo260 antitrust litigation is an especially
vivid example of a catastrophe precipitated by dishonest practice.26' The
lawyers representing Kodak had retained an economist as an expert witness,
expecting that he would testify that Kodak's domination of the market was due
262
to its superior technological innovations, not to anticompetitive behavior.
The plaintiffs counsel requested any documents pertinent to the expert's
testimony, Kodak's lawyer's resisted, and ultimately a magistrate ordered
production of numerous documents including interim reports prepared by the
economist." At the economist's deposition, one of Kodak's lawyers stated that
he had destroyed the interim reports, which were somewhat unfavorable to
Kodak's defense. 2" The lawyer even filed an affidavit in a subsequent
discovery dispute in the case, stating under oath that the documents had been
destroyed.265 In fact, the lawyer had not destroyed the documents, but had

259. Harry Pregerson, The Seven Sins ofAppellateBriefWritingandOther Transgressions,
34 UCLA L. REV. 431,436 (1986).
260. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Company, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
261. For an overview of this case see JAMES B. STEWART, THE PARTNERs 327-65 (1983).
Deborah Rhode summarized this case as a problem in her book. RHODE, supra note 92.
262. See STEWART, supra note 261, at 339-40.
263. Id. at 340.
264. Id. at 340-41.
265. Id. at 344.
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hidden them in his office and withheld them from production. 2" The affidavit
was perjurous. 267 The fallout was a calamity for the firm.268 Kodak fired it and
hired one of its arch-rivals to defend the antitrust case.2 6 9 The firm paid its
client over $600,000 to settle Kodak's claims related to its conduct of the
litigation.27 It lost Kodak's business, which had accounted for approximately
one-fourth of the firm's billings and had employed thirty lawyers full-time.27
The partner who had coordinated the firm's preparation of the economist's
testimony was released
from the firm and spent twenty-seven days in jail for
22
contempt of court.
It is predictable that recent law school graduates will find themselves
handling discovery matters in litigation. Reviewing documents in response to
requests for production is a classic junior associate assignment, as is assisting
with document work in preparation for expert depositions. These new graduates
will be deliberating with partners about whether or not to produce documents.
If a partner wants to find a way to avoid production of harmful documents,
what is the junior associate to do? She could try to broaden the conversation
with the partner to include considerations about what justice requires.2 73 The
adversa.ry system cannot function effectively without full, candid disclosure of
relevant information by both sides, the associate could argue. Thus, justice
demands production of relevant documents in response to an adversary's
request. It would be unrealistic, however, to think that a lawyer determined to
avoid disclosing damaging information would be easily swayed by arguments
from social justice. Arguments from justice are also easily countered by
arguments from an institutional role-it is up to the judge to decide those
questions of policy; the partner might admonish the junior associate. Appeals
based on the Kantian categorical imperative, the principle of utility, 274 or some
other moral principle may also sound hopelessly moralistic and naive. This
situation is one where arguments from prudence can serve as another arrow in
the quiver of a lawyer determined to be honest in the face of pressure to bend
the rules. If enough lawyers are familiar with stories where the bad guys get

punished, maybe the sharper practitioners will comply with their ethical
obligations out of concern for their client's cases, their malpractice exposure,
and their professional reputation. (Associates have to be concerned because
they can be disciplined personally even where they were acting on orders of

266. Id. at 348.

267. Id.
268. See RHODE, supra note 92, at 96.
269. See id.
270. See id.

271. Id.
272. Id. at 97.
273. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann, Can Virtue Be Taught to Lawyers?, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1759,
1770 (1993).
274. See supra notes 131, 156-58 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

51

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 10
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52: 557

their supervisors.) 275 The stories about sleazy lawyers getting their comeuppance would also be a useful corrective to the Rambo narrative, which
glorifies behavior that is detrimental to the legal system. If it can be shown that
many of these Rambos ended up harming their clients' causes, perhaps some
of their glory will fade.
V. CONCLUSION

A theme that emerged from the discussions at this conference is that
professionalism initiatives must generally speak to two different concerns.
First, they must address the reward structures and incentives that characterize
the market for legal services in which lawyers operate. Ignoring considerations
such as lawyers' reputational interests, compensation and employment
incentives, and the responses of judges, provides ammunition to critics like
Posner, who doubt that theorizing about ethics can motivate right action. At the
same time, however, programs aimed at improving lawyer professionalism
must resist the identification of legal ethics with the morals of the marketplace.
Doing the right thing is not simply a matter of responding rationally to the costs
and benefits of a course of action that are structured by the relevant institutions,
pace the rational-choice theorists. Rather, the essence of professionalism
requires attending to the moral dimension oflawyering and seeking motivations
in the intrinsic values that inform professional life.

275. See MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr, R. 5.2(a) (1983).
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